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Abstract 
 
This study explains the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
value. In particular, it highlights the effects of ownership by insiders and 
institutional investors using a measure of firm performance Tobin’s Q and 
return on assets as an alternative measure. The study examines a large sample 
of publicly listed firms in the US for a period of 10 years. It confirms that 
managerial wealth effect on firm performance is clearly positive and the 
entrenchment effect has clearly a negative effect on firm performance. Further, 
ownership by institutional investors shows a distinctly positive effect on firm 
performance which can be addressed by their monitoring and disciplinary 
activities. The effects resulting from size, leverage and beta have also been 
examined for both measures. 
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Deutscher Abstract 
 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Eigentümerstruktur und dem Unternehmenserfolg. Die Eigentümerstruktur 
und ihr Einfluss auf den Unternehmenserfolg sind seit einigen Jahren 
zunehmender Bestandteil zahlreicher empirischer Studien, welche sich jedoch 
in ihren Rückschlüssen widersprechen. Die Arbeit erforscht im Besonderen den 
Eigenkapitalanteil von Insidern und institutionellen Anlegern sowie ihren 
Einfluss auf den Unternehmenserfolg. Als Erfolgsmaß dient dabei das 
Tobin’s Q, welches den Unternehmenserfolg in Marktwerten bemisst. Das auf 
Buchwerte basierende Erfolgsmaß, Return on assets, wird  in der Untersuchung 
als alternative Messgröße herangezogen. Die Studie durchleuchtet hierbei eine 
umfangreiche Stichprobe von börsennotierten Unternehmen in den USA für 
einen Zeitraum von 10 Jahren. Demzufolge wird ein Zusammenhang zwischen 
Unternehmenserfolg und dem Eigenkapitalanteil von Insidern bestätigt. Zudem 
stellt ein hoher Eigenkapitalanteil von institutionellen Investoren einen 
wesentlich positiven Einfluss auf den Unternehmenswert dar. Die 
Auswirkungen von Unternehmensgröße, Verschuldungsgrad und Beta, als 
Risikomaß, werden ebenfalls sowohl in marktwertorientierter als auch in 
buchhalterischer Hinsicht auf den Unternehmenserfolg analysiert. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between ownership structure and performance has been 
the subject of many major studies showing an ongoing debate in the corporate 
finance literature. Managers act as agents of their principals, the shareholders. 
Therefore they have the duty to maximize their principal’s wealth. However, 
managers’ can have divergent interests with their principals. So their primary 
interest may be to maximize personal wealth instead of shareholders’ wealth. 
Early in the 20th century, Berle and Means’ (1932) work argues that with a too 
dispersed ownership the managers might deploy the corporate assets to their 
own benefits rather than to drive shareholder value maximization. 
 
Today, decades after Berle and Means the wealth effect of various 
ownership categories is not yet clear. Inconsistent results of studies 
investigating the relationship of ownership structure and firm value continue. 
According Demsetz (1983), the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm value should be considered to contain endogeneity and the ownership 
structure of a firm is thus an endogenous outcome of a process to maximize 
shareholder value. Later the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show no 
significant relationship between ownership and firm value which confirms the 
equilibrium hypothesis of Demsetz (1983). Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) in 
contrast show a significant relationship between ownership structure and firm 
value. Their results suggest a positive-negative-positive relationship between 
insider ownership and firm value. However, the study conveys its main 
criticism because they ignore the endogeneity problem completely. Later on 
many other academic studies examined the situation with inconsistent results. 
 
This study attempts to investigate the effects of ownership by insiders and 
institutional investors on firmvalue by employing different OLS regressions. 
 20 
The relationship of ownership through insiders has been examined in terms of 
incentive-alignment and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. An additional 
view is given on the ownership by institutional investors which convey an 
increasing importance in the US equity market. The US equity market is 
characterized by a high degree of dispersed ownership which attracts interest 
for investigations on the effects of both insider ownership and institutional 
ownership. Tobin’s Q is employed as primary performance measure whereby 
ROA is used as alternative. To mitigate the endogeneity problem I have used 
lagged variables for the insider ownership coefficients because the underlying 
data set is limited and does not allow other ways to overcome endogeneity. The 
investigation is based on a data set which consists of 47543 observations for a 10 
years period of the years 2000 and 2009. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical background regarding the 
ownership structure and firm value relationship is described in section 2. 
Section 3 describes the main methodical issues and the model. The underlying 
US data is discussed in section 4. In section 5 the results of the regressions are 
presented with the robustness check. Section 6 forms a discussion on the main 
results and conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
This section provides an overview about the definitions and economic 
characters of insider ownership, institutional ownership and performance 
measures. Further theoretical background is given for the associated corporate 
governance part. This section ends with a review of previous research studies 
on ownership effects on firm performance. 
 
 
2.1 Definitions and economic characteristics 
 
There are several vital aspects which should be taken into consideration 
while investigating the ownership effects by insiders and institutional investors 
on firm performance. In the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance many factors play a role, especially corporate governance and 
management compensation. Ownership by institutional investors demonstrates 
also an important effect on firm value due to disciplinary effects. In the 
following, I will briefly explain ownership by insiders and institutional 
investors and the measurement of performance. The coherence between 
correlation, causality and endogeneity will conclude this sub item. 
 
2.1.1 Ownership by Insiders 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) assume that with a higher degree of 
management ownership the agency problem would decrease and thus affect 
positively the value of a firm which is called the incentive effect of managerial 
ownership. Further they argue that the use of debt can decrease the need of 
outside stock and therefore contribute to lower agency costs. However, the 
 22 
managers of a company act as an agent of their principals, the shareholders of 
the company. This situation creates an agency problem because the divergence 
in interests between the agent and the principal which can lead to high agency 
costs and would consequently affect the value of the corporation. Section 2.3 
will provide a broader theoretical view into the relation of insider ownership 
and the agency problem. 
 
2.1.2 Ownership by Institutional Investors 
The higher the share of institutional owners, the larger is their impact in the 
company and also in the capital markets. Therefore, a high level of institutional 
ownership raises the question whether institutional owners enhance, diminish 
or have no effect on firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) examine the 
role of large shareholders and further Coffee (1991) discusses the monitoring 
role of institutional owners. The shareholdings through institutional investors 
like pension funds and mutual funds have increased severely in the past three 
decades. Institutional investors also face difficulty in selling large amounts of 
stocks without depressing the prices.1 Consequently, institutional investors see 
themselves forced to get actively involved in corporate policy decisions and to 
monitor management activities more effectively with the intention of increasing 
stock performance. The monitoring activities of institutional owners and the 
potential for large shareholders to use disciplinary pressures on management 
can be combined with the debt effect. Jensen (1986) argues that managers are 
motivated to achieve a greater level of efficiency with additional borrowing 
because of the pressure of making debt service payments. The disciplinary 
pressures of active institutional ownership and debt financing are to be 
assumed as substitutes regarding Grier and Zychowicz (1994). They find that 
institutional concentration of ownership may act as substitute for the 
                                                 
1 Conley and O’Barr, 1992 
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disciplinary and signaling role of debt because their observations show a 
significant negative relationship between debt and shares owned by 
institutional investors. Thus, Grier and Zychowicz (1994) suggest that 
monitoring and disciplinary activities of institutional investors act as substitute 
for disciplinary and signaling theory of debt. 2  Pozen (1994) examines the 
methods used by institutional investors to affect managerial decision making. 
These methods vary from informal discussion with management to proxy fights 
for company control3. Further Jensen et al. (1999)4 analyze the institutional 
investors monitoring and the effects of insider holdings with other variables 
like dividends and debts. The predominance of institutional ownership of 
shares is an essential feature of capital markets. Their impact is already beyond 
trading volume and day-to-day market price swings and could affect corporate 
governance issues. Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that 
the economic interests of institutional owners can create incentives to efficiently 
monitor managerial activities. Previous studies have addressed the question 
within the context of corporate events such as anti-takeover changes, proxy 
fights and report contradictory results. There are studies assuming that 
institutional ownership influence management decisions of firms. Institutional 
activism has further been examined in studies which investigate the voting 
behavior or large shareholders during proposed anti-takeover charter 
amendments and the associated shareholder wealth effects5.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Grier and Zychowicz, 1994 
3 Pozen, 1994 
4 Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera, and Raymond, 1999 
5 See Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) and Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) 
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2.1.3 Performance Measurement 
The measurement categories for firm performance can be classified in 
general by the investor’s perspective measures and accounting perspective 
measures. Thus the categories of performance measurement are either market 
based or accounting based measures. Consequently the most commonly used 
market based measures are Tobin’s Q and Total Shareholder Return and 
accounting measures are ROA, ROE, and growth in sales. Here, the key 
difference between these two categories is defined by the point of view in time. 
The market based measures try to outline future expected performance whereas 
accounting measures use the actually realized performance. 
 
It was common to use mainly accounting based performance measures in 
empiric studies on firm performance prior to James Tobin’s introduction of the 
ground breaking market based performance measure Tobin’s Q in 1967. 
McFarland (1987) explains that the introduction of Tobin’s Q has caused major 
critic on accounting performance measures. However, although there are 
differences among various performance measures their common goal is to 
measure firm performance. Given that, one could assume a correlation among 
the individual measures whether accounting based or market based ones. 
Though, this assumption does not come true. Several studies, as Geroski (1998) 
and McGahan (1999) show no correlation between individual performance 
measures. As McGahan reports the correlation between Tobin’s Q and 
accounting profit is 0.2466. Similar results are reported by Geroski’s study 
which shows low correlation between the individual measures and even a 
negative one between accounting profit and sales 7 . Therefore the decision 
regarding appropriate choice of the performance measures seems – not 
surprisingly - definitely highly critical. 
                                                 
6 McGahan, 1999 
7 Geroski, 1998 
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2.1.4 Correlation, Causality and Endogeneity 
Although ignored in many studies, the relationship between insider 
ownership and firm performance contains a severe endogeneity problem. This 
issue conveys the main criticism against the work of Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) which ignores endogeneity completely. Demsetz (1983) claims that the 
ownership structure of a corporation as an endogenous outcome of decisions 
that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading of market shares. The 
correlation between two variables itself does not contribute to a causal 
interdependence. This study will mitigate the endogeneity problem by 
involving a further, lagged, variable to measure insider ownership 
 
 
2.2 Ownership and the Principal-agent theory 
 
Adam Smith (1776) was the most famous economist to point out the 
potential for conflict of interests between managers and shareholders in joint-
stock companies.8 Smith describes in “The Wealth of Nations” as following: 
 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over 
it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own.”9 
 
                                                 
8 Dennis C. Mueller, 2003 
9 Adam Smith, 1776 
 26 
Fama and Jensen (1983) define agency costs as “costs of structuring, 
monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests”10. 
Further, Gilson and Whitehead (2007) describe that public shareholders and 
agency costs are the two of the sides of the same coin. Agency costs emerge if 
companies in need of residual risk capital and public investors are the cheapest 
risk-bearers. 11  The cheap capital provided is managed by an agent whose 
interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the capital lender. This 
divergence in interest has been described early in the 20th century in the well 
known work by Adolph Berle and Gardiner C. Means (1932), “The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property”. Its main topic puts a light on the subject of 
the separation of ownership from control in corporations.12 
 
The situation of management and the principal-agent-problem by Berle and 
Means (1932) is further described by the following statement:  
 
“The body of men who, in law, have formally assumed the duties of exercising 
domination over the corporate business and assets………..The separation of ownership 
and management or control creates potential agency costs. Agency costs occur when 
managers or directors take actions adverse to shareholders’ interests”13. 
 
Hence, Berle and Means suggest that the higher the ownership 
concentration is, the higher the performance will be, thus the existence of a 
positive correlation between each other. They claim that managers were in 
effective control of a company whenever its outstanding shares were widely 
dispersed that no single shareholder, person or group held 20 percent or more. 
Additional arguments indicate that corporate assets might be deployed to 
                                                 
10 Fama and Jensen, 1983 
11 Gilson and Whitehead, 2007 
12 Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu, 2008 
13 Berle and Means, 1932 
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benefit managers rather than shareholders, when shareholders are too 
dispersed to enforce value maximization. With the continuing growing 
dispersion of ownership, the management gained higher control. Robert Larner 
(1966) indicates that by mid 1960s the control of some 75 percent of the 200 
largest US corporations had fallen to management. 14  
 
Similar views are presented in the working paper of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) in a broader context. They incorporate elements from the theory of 
agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance that develop a 
theory of the ownership structure of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1973) 
characterize the agency relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons – principals – engage another person – agent – to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent. If the interests of the principal and the agent differ from each other, 
then the agent will not always act in the principal’s best interest. This situation 
is strengthened if both parties are acting toward utility maximization. The value 
loss generated from different objectives of principal and agent is called agency 
costs. As in corporations where a separation of owners and managers exist, 
agency costs will be there. Corporate governance tries to mitigate the 
divergence of interests between owners and managers by a set of mechanisms. 
However, generally it is impossible for the principal or the agent to ensure that 
the agent will make optimal decision from the principal’s perspective. Agency 
costs show up in different forms as following: 15 
 
 Monitoring expenditures by principal, 
 Bonding expenditures by agent, and 
 Residual loss  
                                                 
14 Dennis C. Mueller, 2003 
15 Jensen and Meckling, 1976 
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Monitoring costs are expenses incurred by the principal in the process of 
monitoring the agent’s activities. Bonding incur by the agent in the practice of 
demonstrating that he acts in the best interest of the principal. Residual loss is 
defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as the dollar equivalent of the reduction 
in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of this divergence is also a 
cost of the agency relationship. 
 
So, the principle-agent problem emerges with the existence of the separation 
of ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the 
situations in which corporate managers are the agents of outside shareholders, 
it brings a relationship fraught with conflicting interests. 
 
Managers bear incentives to move their firms beyond the optimal size. 
Growth strengthens the power of manager by increasing resources to their rule. 
Murphy (1985) highlights the fact by the increase in managers’ compensation, 
because changes in compensation are positively related to the growth in sales. 
The tendency of firms to reward middle managers through promotion rather 
than bonus payouts creates another strong incentive toward growth (Baker 
1986).16 Jensen (1986) describes that one manifestation of agency costs is that 
mangers of free cash flow over invest internally generated funds, especially if 
the firm does not have enough positive net present value investment 
opportunities. According to the free cash flow / agency costs hypothesis, the 
excess returns to a dividend change will be negatively related to the amount of 
inside ownership and positively related to any attribute of ownership which 
increases monitoring of firms’ use of free cash flow. 17 
 
                                                 
16 Jensen, 1986 
17 Bajaj, Vijh, and Westerfield, 2002 
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There is no limit to the number of owners a corporation can have and to the 
fraction, share each owner holds of the entire corporation. Additional 
distinctive feature of a corporation is given on that there is no constraint on the 
identity of its stock which allows to free trade the ownership. Therefore 
corporations can raise substantially high amounts of capital. Thus, the 
corporation enables high flexibility in ownership transfer which is one of the 
most important advantages of organizing a firm as a corporation rather than as 
sole proprietorship, partnership, or LLC.18 
 
Two major developments in the last quarter of the twentieth century have 
taken place that curbed the dimension of the separation of ownership from 
control in the United States. First, the hostile takeover wave which replaced 
management of acquired companies. Further, as Michael Jensen foresaw ahead 
of time19 , Gilson and Whitehead (2007) record a large movement of public 
companies into private ownership through leveraged acquisitions by private 
equity firms. 20 Second, institutional investors mainly pension funds, mutual 
funds and other investment funds which concentrate share holdings have 
grown immensely. Shareholdings in the United States today are more 
concentrated than Larner found in the early 1960s.21 
 
                                                 
18 Jonathan Berk, Peter DeMarzo, 2006 
19 Jensen, 1989 
20 Gilson and Whitehead, 2007 
21 Dennis C. Mueller, 2003 
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2.3  Ownership and Corporate Governance 
 
The central importance in this study is demonstrated by the associated part 
with Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
define this situation as following: 
 
“Corporate Governance deals with the agency problem: the separation of 
management and finance. The fundamental question of corporate governance is how to 
assure financiers that they get a return on their financial investment”22 
 
Another shareholder-wealth based view is defined by Mayer (2003): 
 
“Corporate Governance is concerned with ways of bringing the interests and 
objectives of investors and managers into line and ensuring that firms are run for the 
benefit of investors”23 
 
Both definitions above are based on the shareholder approach to corporate 
governance. Contradictory to the above given definitions is the one of Tirole 
(2001) which finds this traditional approach too restricted. Rather to focus on 
the investors’ interests purely, Tirole (2001) argues for a broader definition of 
corporate governance which covers the interests of all stakeholders and how 
they are affected by the firm’s decision. 
 
“The traditional shareholder value approach is too narrow a view for an economic 
analysis of corporate governance. I will, perhaps unconventionally for an economist, 
define corporate governance as the design of institutions that induce or force 
management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders. The provision of managerial 
                                                 
22 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 
23 Mayer, 2003 
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incentives and the design of a control structure must account for their impact on the 
utilities of all stakeholders (natural stakeholders and investors) in order to, respectively, 
induce or force internalization. I will argue that, if acase is to be made in favor of 
shareholder value, this case must rest on a careful consideration of the economics of 
incentives and control”24 
 
However, as the essence of this study conveys the focus on the relation of 
managers and firm value, the shareholder perspective to corporate governance 
sets the main foundation. Along with the shareholder perspective to corporate 
governance, one can make further classification mainly into dispersed and 
concentrated ownership. The main factor which determines whether the market 
for corporate shares characterizes itself by dispersed or concentrated ownership 
is the level of shareholder protection. As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) present, in their investigation on ownership structures of large 
corporations in 27 economies, a different picture of the ownership structure 
than the widely accepted in the finance literature. The dispersed ownership 
structure of the corporation, as Berle and Means suggest, is only a common 
organizational form for large firms in the richest common law countries, above 
all the United States. Outside the United States, especially in markets with poor 
shareholder protection, even the largest firms tend to have controlling 
shareholders.  
 
Therefore one needs to distinguish between such different markets as 
Gugler (2001) presents in ‘Corporate Governance and Economic Performance’, a 
theoretical framework of the European Corporate Governance Network with 
regard to the separation of ownership and voting power as outlined in the 
Executive Report by Becht (1997). An overview is given by table 1 and table 2 in 
the following. The much of the existing empirical literature compares quadrant 
                                                 
24 Tirole, 2001 
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I and quadrant IV companies where quadrant I is characterized with high 
liquidity and agency problems as consequence of missing direct monitoring. 
Quadrant IV, in contrast is characterized by direct monitoring and shows low 
liquidity, high capital costs and risk of rent-extraction by majority owners 
resulting from the agency conflict with minority holders. The classical position 
where the principal-agent may occur is also represented by quadrant I. The US 
equity market which is investigated in this work is therefore determined by the 
attributes of quadrant I. As given below, table 1 and table 2 explain the basic 
trade-offs encountered with the dispersion and concentration of cash flow and 
control rights25. 
 
Table 1 - Dispersion-Concentration tradeoffs for investors26 
DISPERSED OWNERSHIP 
Quadrant I Quadrant II 
Dispersed Voting Power Concentrated Voting Power 
Advantages: Advantages: 
Liquidity Direct monitoring 
Diversification (risk sharing) Liquidity 
Low cost of capital Diversification 
Disadvantages: Lower cost of capital than in Quadrant IV 
Lack of direct monitoring (free-riding problem, 
absenteeism) 
Disadvantages: 
Implications: Cash flow and control incentives misaligned 
‘Strong Managers, Weak Owners’ (Roe, 1994) Potential collusion (manager–block-holder) 
Takeovers possible Extraction of private benefits 
Management Control or Market Control (Becht 
and Mayer 2001) 
Implications : 
Possible research questions: ‘Strong Voting Block-holders, 
Are OC firms more profitable than MC firms? Weak Minority Owners’ 
What are the consequences of (hostile) 
takeovers? 
Takeovers impossible 
Is there management entrenchment? Possible research questions: 
 Is there rent extraction by block-holders? 
 Does the identity of investors matter? 
 What are the effects of pyramiding? 
 
                                                 
25 Gugler, 2001 
26 Notes: OC = owner controlled; MC = manager controlled 
Gugler (2001) with underlying sources: Becht (1997); Becht and Mayer (2001) 
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Table 2 – Tradeoffs for investors with ownership concentration27 
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
Quadrant III Quadrant IV 
Dispersed voting power Concentrated voting power 
Advantages: Advantages: 
Some protection of small shareholders from 
voting right restrictions 
Direct monitoring 
Disadvantages: Cash flow and control interests aligned 
Cash-flow and control incentives misaligned Disadvantages: 
Few means of intervention Low liquidity 
Low liquidity Low diversification 
Low diversification opportunities High cost of capital 
High cost of capital Potential rent extraction by majority-owner 
Implications: Implications : 
Mostly disadvantages ‘Weak Managers, Weak Minority Owners, 
Strong Majority Owners’ 
‘Strong Managers, Weak Owners’ Possible research questions: 
Takeovers difficult Are OC firms more profitable than MC firms? 
Possible research questions: Is there rent extraction by large shareholders? 
Is there management entrenchment? Does the identity of investors matter? 
 
Cremers and Nair (2005) present in their work a variety of corporate 
governance mechanisms and their interactions. These are firm-level 
mechanisms associated with the governance of public corporations. The firm-
level mechanisms can be classified broadly into internal and external 
governance mechanisms. Primary internal monitoring mechanisms are 
blockholders and the board of directors while takeovers and the market for 
corporate control are the primary external mechanisms. The study takes the 
percentage of share ownership by public pension funds and, institutional 
investors, and the percentage of share ownership by the largest blockholder as 
proxies for internal governance. Their findings show that in relation with long-
term abnormal returns and accounting measures of profitability the external 
and internal governance mechanisms are strong complements and this 
complementary interaction is stronger for low leverage firms. 28  Within the 
                                                 
27 Notes: OC = owner controlled; MC = manager controlled 
Gugler (2001) with underlying sources: Becht (1997); Becht and Mayer (2001) 
28 Cremers and Nair, 2005 
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corporate governance mechanisms an additional importance is given by the 
owner identity because different types of owners will follow different interests. 
Owners tend not always to maximize shareholder value rather they tend to 
maximize their own utility which does not necessarily lead always to 
shareholder value maximization. Therefore a problem can occur between major 
stock holders and minority owners. The quadrant IV is characterized by this 
attributes. However, as the US market is characterized by dispersed ownership, 
as described in quadrant I, the study will not handle further the owner identity. 
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2.4 Previous Research 
 
Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) highlight that the larger fraction of a 
company’s shares held by its managers, the value diminishing effect will 
emerge. This circumstance is called the entrenchment effect. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders are the address of the agency 
problem because they have both a general interest in profit maximization and 
enough control over the assets to have their interests respected. The agency 
costs in this relation, the entrenchment costs and costs of large shareholders are 
modeled by Stulz (1988). Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) further find 
empirically that higher insider ownership can serve to entrench managers, 
however, and thus increase agency costs. Their findings on managerial 
ownership and firm value for US firms show an inverse U-shaped relationship. 
In the range of insider ownership where the increased entrenchment effect is 
dominant, the excess returns of a dividend change need not be negatively 
related to the amount of inside ownership.  
 
Corresponding to the findings of Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) is Jensen 
and Meckling’s argumentation on the existing convergence between 
shareholder and manager interests which increases with an increase in 
managerial ownership.29 Besides the findings of Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
several studies have found a non-linear relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance which, under the agency model, indicates managerial 
entrenchment.  Other studies which state a significant non-linear relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance are done by McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), Denis and Sarin (1999) in US and Short and Keasey (1999) and 
                                                 
29 Jensen and Meckling, 1976 
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Weir et al. (2002) in the UK .30 A theory on similar outcomes as the empirical 
study of McConnell and Servaes (1990) is given by Stulz (1988). In his model, 
Stulz predicts also a concave relationship between management ownership and 
firm value. The model shows the increasing managerial ownership and control, 
a negative effect on firm value related with the managerial ownership begins to 
surpass the incentive benefits of managerial ownership. 
 
As stated, the relationship between ownership and corporate performance 
was subject to a number of researches and however numbers of these researches 
show inconsistent conclusions. One of the most famous supporting studies has 
been done by Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) as given above. Other studies 
such as McConnell and Servaes (1990) with Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
contribute further evidence that insider ownership is an effective tool in 
reducing agency costs. On the other hand Demsetz and Lehn (1985) lead the 
part of investigations which show no evidence between the insider ownership 
and corporate value relation. Others are for instance Loderer and Sheehan 
(1989), Denis and Loderer and Martin (1997). There might be possible 
explanations for contradicting results in many ways. Farinha (2003) argues that 
many studies do not properly distinguish the possibility of alignment of 
interests across a certain range of ownership and the possibility of 
entrenchment over another range of ownership. Further Farinha (2003) claims 
that the analysis do not take into account the likelihood that several different 
mechanisms for alignment of interests can be used simultaneously which leads 
to substitution effects with insider ownership. Different compositions of 
corporate governance mechanisms by different companies, however each based 
on optimal usage, lead to unobservable relationship between performance and 
any of definite mechanisms used.31  
                                                 
30 McKnight and Weir, 2009 
31 Farinha, 2003 
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 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn (1985) present results which support 
the arguments Demsetz (1983) has reported previously. Harold and Demsetz 
(1983) argue that the ownership structure of a firm is an endogenous outcome 
of a process to maximize shareholders’ interest and this should be taken into 
account when estimating its effect on firm performance. This, the equilibrium 
hypothesis of Demsetz (1983), suggests no systematic relationship between the 
change in the ownership structure and the change in firm performance. Thus, 
the ownership structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium and 
reflects optimizing behavior of managers and investors. As the optimal 
ownership structure differs across firms, differences in ownership structure 
occur but there is no systematic relation given cross-sectionally.  According to 
that, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) estimate a simple linear relationship between 
accounting profit rates and ownership by large shareholders. Their study of 511 
large US companies on measures of ownership concentration investigates the 
percentage of shares owned by the most important shareholders; the five 
largest and twenty largest, and an approximation of the Herfindahl 
concentration index. Their findings show no significant relation between 
ownership concentration and accounting profit rate. This however is 
inconsistent with the Berle and Means (1932) thesis but the evidence is in line 
with the equilibrium argument of Demsetz (1983)32 
 
However, together as mentioned above with Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) there is a body of evidence that suggest alternative hypotheses. Mørck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny estimate a piecewise linear regression in which they use 
Tobin’s Q and profit rate 33  as the dependent variable and investigate its 
                                                 
32 Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 
33 Profit rate is defined as rate as the ratio of the firm’s net cash flows (less the inflation 
adjusted value of depreciation) to the replacement cost of the firm’s tangible assets. 
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relationship to the fraction of shares owned by managers. In the 1980 cross-
section sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms, they find evidence of a significant 
nonmonotonic relationship. Their results suggest a positive relation between 
ownership and Tobin’s Q as Q increases in the 0 percent to 5 percent range, 
then a negative and less distinct relation in the 5 percent to 25 percent range, 
and a further positive relation beyond 25 percent and slightly higher as 
ownership by board of directors rises. 
 
Figure 1 – The relationship between board ownership and Tobin’s Q implied by the 
piecewise linear ordinary least squares regression of 1980 for 371 Fortune 500 firms.34 
 
Using the profit rate as an alternate dependent variable to measure 
management performance, Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny show similar piecewise 
linear relationship as Tobin’s Q, given that the statistical significance is lower. 
Nevertheless, the following differences exist between their procedures and the 
one of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). First, MSV focus only on equity stakes of the 
boards of directors, whereas Demsetz and Lehn (1985) measure concentration of 
ownership, weighting ownership by members of the board and by other large 
shareholders equally. Second, Demsetz and Lehn estimate a linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and the profit rate. When MSV estimate a 
                                                 
34 Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988 
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simple linear relationship between the profit rate and their board stake variable, 
they get consistent results to Demsetz and Lehn (1985). MSV argues with the 
failure of Demsetz and Lehn to find a relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability is probably due to their use of linear 
specification that does not cover an important non-monotonicity. 35 
 
Loderer and Sheehan (1989) investigate the action of insider owners in 
corporations that experience large declines in equity value over an extended 
period of time. These are firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1971 and 1985. 
They claim that the stock of the median bankrupt corporation experiences a 
cumulative abnormal return of minus 92 percent during the 1,300 trading days 
preceding the announcement of bankruptcy filings. Loderer and Sheehan find 
no evidence that officers and directors systematically bail out prior bankruptcy. 
Further, in spite of substantial and protracted wealth loss, there is little 
evidence that insider shareholdings in bankrupt firms are lower than those 
observed for similar insiders in control firms. Though, Loderer and Sheehan 
also mention that this could have two major reasons. First, insiders of failing 
firms are unable to predict changes in firm value better than the market or they 
are reluctant to trade. Such reluctance to trade is rooted, among others, in 
concerns about sending adverse signals to suppliers and employees, the 
possibility of resigning before selling the shares, laws against insider trading, or 
fears of lawsuits from displeased shareholders. However, Loderer and Sheehan 
do not find convincing evidence supporting any of the above explanations.36 
 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), use a similar approach to Mørck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988). They investigate the cross section relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and management equity ownership for a large sample of New York 
                                                 
35 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988 
36 Loderer and Sheehan, 1989 
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Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange listed companies; 1,173 
companies in 1976 and 1,093 companies in 1986. Similar as Mørck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, they use the accounting profit rate as their alternative performance. The 
main difference to MSV is that McConnell and Servaes look at two years 
compared to one year. Other differences include the number of firms which is 
roughly twice as large for McConnell and Servaes, the sample is more 
heterogeneous in terms of firm size and besides the aggregate insider holdings 
McConnell and Servaes include two additional governance mechanisms; 
ownership concentration and the fraction held by institutional investors. An 
important point can be that in this work the term insider covers not only 
directors but also officers. For both sample of years McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) find a significant curvilinear relation between Tobin’s q and management 
ownership. Tobin’s q tends to increase at a lower rate as ownership becomes 
more important until inside ownership reaches 40 percent to 50 percent, and 
then to slope downward as shares become concentrated in the hands of 
managers and members of the board of directors. McConnell and Servaes’ 
findings confirm only 0 percent and 5 percent of management ownership range 
from the study of Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and fail to confirm the 
findings of MSV beyond 5 percent.  They find additionally a strong positive 
relation between Tobin’s q and shares held by institutional investors. For the 
relationship between block ownership and firm value no significance can be 
reported. McConnell and Servaes also point out that their results are consistent 
with neither theoretical arguments of Demsetz (1983) nor the empirical findings 
of Demsetz and Lehn (1985).37 
 
In the above given studies one can see contradictory results on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Stacey R. 
Kole (1995) investigates the contradictory results on the managerial ownership 
                                                 
37 McConnell and Servaes, 1990 
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and firm performance. In her study she argues that solely the differences in 
managerial ownership data - as given above between Demsetz and Mørck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny - cannot explain contradictory empirical evidence on the 
relation between ownership and entrenchment of managers. 38 
 
Loderer and Martin (1997) examine in their study the evidence that 
managers’ shareholdings give incentives to avoid share-price-decreasing 
decisions and to seek out share-price-increasing ones. The study investigates 
the empirical evidence on the effect of executive stock ownership to better 
performance in the context of acquisitions of publicly traded corporations.  In 
doing so, Loderer and Martin, measure acquisition performance with the 
abnormal stock returns at the time of the acquisition announcement. They 
mostly find a positive but a very weak relation between acquisition 
performances against executive stock ownership in particular. The same 
situation investigated in a simultaneous equations framework, no evidence that 
larger ownership stake increases performance. In contrast, performance seems 
to affect the level of stock ownership of executives. Further, while expecting 
that more profitable acquisitions appear to encourage larger stockholdings, they 
find out that higher Q ratios induce smaller holdings. This behavior is 
supported by their assumption that Q ratios measure growth opportunities 
already capitalized in the stock price and thus there is little reason to hold stock 
of firms with high Q ratios. Moreover, since managers’ human capital might 
already be tied to their firms’ fortunes, high Q ratio could induce them to 
liquidate at least a part of executive holdings. These empirical findings do not 
seem to be exclusive of acquisitions, Loderer and Martin find the same pattern 
when replicating the analysis by focusing more generally on firm performance.  
The positive and significant influence of managerial ownership on firm value in 
a standard single-equation framework vanishes in a simultaneous equations 
                                                 
38 Kole, 1995 
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context. Finally, the study also considers the influence of large outside 
blockholders and financial institutions on acquisition decisions and firm 
performance but there is no evidence for a  convincing pattern in this relation.39 
 
Another study which is challenging the work of Mørck, Shleifer, Vishny 
(1988) is done by Cho (1998). His paper examines the relation among ownership 
structure, investment and firm value. Cho explores first how ownership 
structure affects corporate value with the hypothesis that ownership structure 
affects investment which in turn affects corporate value. Second, Cho test 
whether ownership structure is exogenous. According to this study, the 
possibility that ownership structure, investment and firm value are 
endogenously determined, as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue, is given if the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) will generate inconsistent parameter estimates 
which might lead to misinterpretation of regression results and incorrect 
management decisions. With the cross-section analysis of Fortune 500 
manufacturing companies in 1991, a significant relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value is appearing in a consistent way corresponding 
with the Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). The study also presents a non-
monotonic relation between insider ownership and investment, where 
investment is measured as capital expenditures and research and development 
(R&D) expenditures. The relation is positive below an insider ownership level 
of 7 percent, negative between 7 percent and 38 percent, and positive for levels 
above 38 percent.  
 
                                                 
39 Loderer and Martin, 1997 
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Figure 2 – The relationship between insider ownership and investment in capital 
expenditures and research and development (R&D) expenditures implied by the piecewise 
linear ordinary least squares regression of 1991 investment on insider ownership and other firm 
characteristics for 326 Fortune 500 firms. Capital expenditures and R&D expenditures are 
divided by the replacement cost of assets to control firm size.40 
 
This result might lead to a false conclusion that ownership structure affects 
investment and thus firm value. However, this specification does not account 
for endogeneity. Estimating a simultaneous equation regression instead of OLS 
to control endogeneity, Cho finds out that firm value affects ownership 
structure but not vice versa. However, the reverse affection is not given which 
challenges the implicit assumption that ownership structure is exogenously 
determined. Cho argues that the implicit assumption of exogenous ownership 
structure conveys misconception of the results because OLS regression results 
are highly influenced. Thus, he questions the outcomes in previous studies 
which examine ownership structure as exogenous. 
 
                                                 
40 Cho, 1998 
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Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the use of seven selected mechanisms 
to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These 
mechanisms are as following: insider shareholdings, outside directors, debt 
policy, corporate control market activity, institutional shareholdings, large 
blockholders, and managerial labor market. The investigation finds out that 
there is a significant relationship between firm performance and the first four of 
the above given mechanisms existing when each is included in a separate OLS 
regression. Their work investigates the empirical relation between firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s q and the extent to which the various 
control mechanisms are used. Agrawal and Knoeber argue that since alternative 
control mechanisms exist, a greater use of a single mechanism need not be 
positively related to firm performance. Distinction among the mechanisms can 
be done through inside or outside determination. The use of four out of the 
seven control mechanisms is decided by firm’s internal decisions and the use of 
the other three is affected by outside parties. Internal decisions cover insider 
shareholding, outside representation on the board, reliance on debt financing, 
and reliance on external labor markets. External ones are given as institutional 
shareholdings, outside blockholdings, and activity in the market for corporate 
control. A greater use of each mechanism yields a benefit by improving 
managerial incentives but also conveys costs. An equally good performance can 
be generated even when one specific mechanism is used less, while others may 
be used more. Agrawal and Knoeber view regressions of a single mechanism to 
firm performance difficult to interpret because of the existence of alternative 
control mechanisms and their possible interdependences, such regression fail to 
consider interrelations among control mechanisms. As the extent to which 
several of the control mechanisms are used is decided within a firm, Agrawal 
and Knoeber suppose like Demsetz and Lehn that the choice of the use and its 
extent will be made to maximize firm value. The degree of the use of a 
mechanism is determined by the match of marginal costs and marginal benefits 
to the firm. Their study is the first to address directly the empirical importance 
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of the interdependence among control mechanisms on estimates of the effects of 
the above given control mechanisms on firm value. The empiric data cover 
nearly 400 large US firms on which insider shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, shareholding of large block holders, outside board members, 
debt, external labor market for managers, and takeover activity is measured.  
Main aspects of this study is first to find evidence of interdependence among 
control mechanisms, second to examine the empirical relation between the 
mechanisms and firm performance. Their results for the single mechanisms 
OLS regression, where Tobin’s q is regressed on the entire set of control 
mechanisms, show statistically significant positive relation between firm 
performance and insider ownership, while the relationship with outside 
representation on the board of directors, debt financing, and corporate control 
activity is significantly negative. In the expanded OLS regression, in which all 
mechanisms are put together, the relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance disappeared but rest remains same. The simultaneous 
equations estimations, in which all mechanisms are put together, the effects of 
insider ownership, debt, and corporate control activity, are all statistically 
insignificant but the outsiders on the board show a continual negative effect. 
This finding is inconsistent with most other s as the use of outsiders in the 
board usually conveys positive effects. 41 
 
The study of Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) provides a 
comprehensive cross section comparison of about 1,500 publicly traded US 
corporations in 1935 with a modern benchmark of more than 4,200 exchange-
listed companies in 1995.  Their main aim is to examine a number of important 
issues such as the changes in characteristics of firms and managers have 
changed as the economy, the financial system, and regulation have changed in 
this time frame. Additionally, the long term comparison enables to examine 
                                                 
41 Agrawal, Knoeber, 1996 
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three alternative hypotheses about the change of costs and benefits of 
managerial ownership. First, as managerial ownership is one of many 
mechanisms to mitigate agency problems: The study finds no evidence for 
substitution hypothesis, which argues that insider ownership is substituting for 
alternative mechanisms. This could be incentive-based compensation, 
monitoring by board of directors, market for corporate control or product-
market competition. The second hypothesis considers a link between firm 
performance and managerial ownership where firm performance is measured 
with Tobin’s q. Their findings show for 1935 a similar pattern to Mørck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), for 1995 this pattern still exists but in a weaker 
shape. The third hypothesis concerns how firm-specific characteristics which 
are associated with costs and benefits of monitoring affect the level of 
managerial ownership. The study documents no change in the comparison. 
Most factors, such as firm size and regulation, have similar effects on 
managerial ownership in 1935 and 1995.42  
 
By adding new variables to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) extended their work to enlighten variations in 
ownership structure. They use panel data of 600 firms from 1982 to 1992. 
Himmelberg et al. show that managerial ownership can be explained both by 
observable characteristics and unobserved features of the firm’s contracting 
environment. The control for various possible unobserved heterogeneities and 
for the endogeneity issue, they utilize a fixed effects panel data model and 
instrumental variables. They highlight that visible characteristics of the 
company affect the level of insider ownership. Himmelberg et al. conclude that 
most variations in managerial ownership are explained by unobserved firm 
                                                 
42 Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999 
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heterogeneity and managerial ownership does not affect firm performance in a 
significant way.43 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) highlight like Cho (1998) the issue of 
endogeneity of ownership structure in their investigation of the relationship 
between ownership and firm performance. Coefficients of single equation 
models of the effect of ownership on performance might be biased. Additional 
bias emerges might likely to yield from complex interest relations which are 
linked with each other. They are using an econometric model which has two 
equations to examine, for both as OLS and 2SLS regressions. The first takes firm 
performances as a dependent variable, Tobin’s q into account. The second uses 
the fraction of shares owned by management as dependent variable. Demsetz 
and Villalonga argue that their study shows unambiguous evidence for the 
endogeneity of ownership structure. For OLS the results imply ownership 
structure is significant in explaining performance. The 2SLS results show no 
significant relationship. However, their results are consistent with the view that 
the ownership structure is systematically chosen in the way to value maximize 
firm performance. 44 
 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) study the ownership patterns 
following to La Porta et al. (1999). In their study they first identify the 
immediate shareholders of a corporation which in most cases are corporate 
entities, nonprofit foundations, or financial institutions. Then, identify their 
owners, the owners of the owners, and the like. In eight East Asian economies 
they investigate 1301 corporations and try to disentangle the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of the largest owners by studying cash flow and voting 
rights. Besides the work of Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu (2008) they have also tried 
                                                 
43 Himmelberg, Hubbard, Palia, 1999 
44 Demsetz, Villalonga, 2001 
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to separate wealth effect between the entrenchment effects of insider 
ownership. Claessens et al. suggest to measure wealth effect with cash flow 
rights and the entrenchment effect with control rights of large shareholders. A 
further view on this will be shown in Section III. The findings explain 
consequently that cash flow rights of the largest owner are positively related to 
firm value as incentive alignment effect. The voting rights of the largest owner 
are negatively related to firm value, which demonstrates the entrenchment 
effect. 45 
 
A highly interesting contribution to the literature is done by Gugler, 
Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2008). Their work mainly presents a clean method for 
separating the positive wealth effect from the negative entrenchment of insider 
ownership. The effect of insider ownership is measured by both Tobin’s 
(average) q and different to the previous studies, the marginal q. Most studies 
follow Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and use Tobin’s q to measure firm 
performance. However, there are several studies which question whether 
ownership is exogenous in relation to the firm performance. Therefore Gugler, 
Mueller, and Yurtoglu use marginal q as a measure of firm performance which 
does not convey endogeneity. Management decisions in fact affect firm value; 
this can be observed in decisions of over-investment such as mergers amongst 
other. To measure wealth effects of insider ownership they employ a variable 
which is the value of insiders’ shareholdings (VS) which can measure 
proportional effects on firm value and thus effects on the net wealth of the 
manager in an accurate manner compared to the fraction of shares managers 
hold (INS). INS, in prior studies a measure to examine both wealth and 
entrenchment effects of insider ownership, is used in this study merely to 
measure the entrenchment effect.  The estimate of marginal q is given by the 
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ratio of a firm’s return on investment to its cost of capital.46 The investigation 
covers US, non-US Anglo-Saxon countries and European Civil Law countries. 
To separate the wealth effect from the entrenchment effect it has used the value 
of a control group’s shareholdings to capture positive wealth effect and the 
fractional holdings to capture the negative entrenchment effect. The results 
show significant positive wealth effect and negative significant entrenchment 
effect.  47 
                                                 
46  For further studies on the methodology estimating marginal q see: Mueller and 
Reardon (1993), Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003b), Gugler et al. 
(2003a,b, 2004) 
47 Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, 2008 
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3 Methodology 
 
For our firm value regression with control variables that Mørck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) advanced as important determinants of Tobin’s Q. Following a 
number of previous studies in this field, my primary performance measure is 
Tobin’s Q. As an alternative measure I choose the accounting profit rate 
measure return on assets (ROA). Further, the control variables include firm size, 
leverage, beta and both industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are 
based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 
 
 
3.1 Wealth effects of manager-shareholder conflicts 
 
As some possible manifestations of agency problems we first count empire 
building and growth maximization as a goal for managers. This was 
investigated by Marris (1964)48. This occurs as ways for managers to take 
advantage of the separation of ownership from control. Gugler, Mueller, 
Yurtoglu (2008), hereafter GMY, highlight that growth-maximizing managers 
will invest more than optimal in relation to the shareholder wealth, thus returns 
on the investment will be lower than its cost of capital. In this context GMY 
describes implications of the managerial over-investment with the following 
example: 
 
„…assume that a company is expected to earn profits of π from now to 
infinity, and pays all profits out as dividends. The market value of its equity is 
then M=π/i, where i is its cost of capital. Assume its initial capital stock equals 
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its market value, M=K, so that Tobin's q is 1.0. The managers choose to expand 
the firm's capital stock by α percent through an investment I, I=αK. For 
argument's sake, assume that the return on this investment is zero, and it is 
funded by issuing new shares. Assuming rational expectations on the part of 
the stock market, the value of the firm's existing shares falls by α percent, as 
soon as the managers announce the sale of shares to finance the unprofitable 
investment. If the managers own shares in their company, they will suffer a 
wealth loss of α percent of the value of their shareholdings. Thus, the bigger the 
value of their shareholdings, the greater is their wealth loss from an 
unprofitable expansion of their company…”49 
 
As the above given example describes, for all decisions of this kind, which 
have proportional effects on firm value, the proper way of measuring wealth 
effects is given by using the value of insiders’ shareholdings. Similar steps are 
taken by managers in mergers and acquisitions activities.  
 
 
3.2 Entrenchment effect of insider ownership 
 
Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu (2008) assume the negative entrenchment effect of 
managerial ownership to be nonlinear. Previous studies have used the fraction 
of insider shareholding to measure both positive wealth effects and negative 
entrenchment effects. However, GMY (2008) claim that all positive effects of 
insider ownership should be captured by the wealth of insider shareholdings, 
and insider shareholdings will have a purely negative effect on performance. By 
doing so, they are making the joint hypothesis that (1) the proportional effects 
of managers’ decision on shareholders’ wealth dominate the absolute effects, 
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and (2) insider shareholdings measures the negative entrenchment effects and 
insider’s wealth the positive wealth effects. However, Claessens et al. (2002, 
hereafter CDFL) have attempted earlier to separate the wealth and 
entrenchment effects of managerial shareholdings.  Their study is affected by 
the advantage of highly concentrated shareholdings in East Asia. Further, the 
fact that cash flow and control rights sometimes differ for large shareholders 
contributes another advantage. Claessens et al. (2002) argue to measure the 
wealth effects of ownership with a measure of cash flow rights, and the 
entrenchment effects by using control rights of large shareholders.   GMY argue 
that the method used by CDFL conveys several shortcomings. First, because of 
the absence of large shareholders and of the kinds of corporate pyramids and 
multiple-vote shares which consequently leads to the divergence of cash flow 
and control rights this cannot be applied to the US. Even markets, as the 
German, which are characterized with concentrated ownership and large 
shareholders cash flow rights and control rights represent the same for the most 
of the shareholders. 
 
 
3.3 Endogeneity between insider ownership and firm performance 
 
  The nature of investment opportunities of a firm may make managerial 
ownership to be endogenous. To mitigate the endogeneity effects in relation to 
the ownership structure and firm performance, as above mentioned in Section II 
with Demsetz (1983) and the others, here a different approach is to be utilized 
compared to the before mentioned  studies. The underlying data set allows 
limited flexibility to mitigate endogeneity effects. This situation can however be 
solved with a firm solution by using a lagged variable for insider shareholdings 
and insider wealth whereby the value of insider ownership and insider wealth 
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of t-2 are taken into account. Only the robustness check, however will employ 
the values in t=0 for insider ownership and insider wealth variables. 
 
 
3.4 Model Specification 
 
If we assume managers to be risk averse, a nonlinear relationship between 
the value of managers’ shareholdings and company performance can be 
expected because the managers’ utility will increase nonlinearly with their 
wealth. This nonlinearity is captured by including both linear and quadratic 
terms in VS in the equation with a positive coefficient predicted for VS and a 
negative coefficient for VS2.  The negative entrenchment effect of insider 
ownership might also be nonlinear as stated above. Therefore I use a similar 
approach to GMY and estimate two slopes for the insider ownership variable. 
There are reasons for a negative relationship with firm performance and 
company size. Further, entrenchment can be expected to increase with the size 
of managerial shareholdings. Additionally, keeping managerial shareholdings 
constant, entrenchment may also increase with the size of the firm. In the 
perfect capital market outsiders could easily raise required funds to takeover a 
poorly performing company. Therefore size is not a protection for managers 
engaging in substantial on-the-job-consumption. Yet if capital markets are less 
than perfect, size can play a considerable role in protecting managers from 
takeovers. Another reason for the negative company size and firm performance 
relationship arises from the case that small companies may have limitation to 
raise sufficient funds to finance further wealth generating investments because 
of asymmetric information. Thus, their q might lie above one 50 . Another 
                                                 
50 Further information about the relationship between asymmetric information problem 
and investment, see Myers and Majluf (1984), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992). Both use size to 
identify firms subject to asymmetric information problems. 
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important variable to be included in the model is leverage. However, this 
variable itself is likely to be function of some variables in the model as several 
different hypotheses treat leverage as a function of insider concentration. 
Moreover, there are different opinions whether the relationship between 
leverage and firm performance is a negative or a positive one. However, since 
the goal of the study is not to measure determinants of leverage, a deeper 
investigation of its interdependencies does not effectively contribute to the aim. 
If we use leverage in the equations it picks generally a negative coefficient 
except while measuring just size, leverage and beta separately. With the aim of 
measuring risk, as a measure of instability, we use beta which is given by value 
line beta in our data set.  On regressing Tobin’s q, the coefficient for value line 
beta shows a positive value. Thus, we have our following specification ready 
for testing the impact of insider ownership and institutional ownership as 
determinants of firm value defined by Tobin’s and to be compared  with the 
accounting profit measure return on assets (ROA): 
 
q = c + β0INS + β1INS2+ β2INS3+ β3VS + β4VS2 + β5ITN + β6ITN2 + β7S + β8L + β9B + μ, 
 
where c is the constant, β0 is the coefficient on INS for managerial 
shareholdings and β2 the coefficient for shareholders’ wealth VS, β4 the 
coefficient for institutional shareholdings and ITN for institutional 
shareholdings, etc. 
 
Furthermore, to exclude astronomic values for Tobin’s q, I have limited the 
output of Tobin’s q to the values between 0 and 10. Another important 
condition is to take values where the insider ownership of two preceding years 
is not equal to 0 because the aim of this study is to analyze the effects of insider 
shareholdings to mitigate endogeneity. 
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4 Data 
 
The financial data taken in this study for the period has been compiled by 
Damodaran51. As published Damodaran made use of following sources to 
gather the data: 
 
Value Line Database: tracks about 7000+ firms and provides accounting and 
market data on them monthly. 
 
Morningstar: follows all trades on US stocks and has information on 8000+ 
companies. Any mutual fund data is also obtained from Morningstar. 
 
Most of the accounting data reflects the most recent annual report or 10K. 
The trailing 12 month net income and sales reflect the numbers as of the last 
four quarters. 
 
The samples from year 2000 to 2009, a 10 year period, have been used for the 
study. From this initial data, banks and financial institutions and some service 
industries (SICs 6000 through 6999 and above 8100) are excluded because 
otherwise it would bias the results as the nature of capital and investment in 
these industries is not comparable to that of non-financial firms. Thus, a data set 
of 47543 observations remains. From this basis further exclusion is made on 
observations with insider ownership to pursue the goal of the investigation. 
 
                                                 
51 The Data Page by Damodaran, accessed in May 2010: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html 
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4.1 Definition of Variables 
 
Table 3 – Variables and definitions 
Variable Definition 
t_q Tobin’s Q = Firm Value / Total Assets 
roa Return on Asset = EBIT / Total Assets 
ins Number of shares held by insiders (as defined by the SEC to 
include corporate officers, directors and those holding more than 
5percent of the outstanding stock) as a percent of total stock 
outstanding 
ins_t2 ins but in year t-2 
itn Number of shares held by mutual funds, pension funds and 
trusts as a percent of total stock outstanding. 
vs Insiders’ wealth: INS * Estimated market value of equity, 
obtained by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the 
share price. 
vs_t2 As vs but in t-2 
size Size measured by log(Total Assets) 
leverage Leverage = Total debt / Total Assets 
beta Estimated by regressing weekly returns on stock against NYSE 
composite, using 5 years of data or listed period (if less than 5 
years). If data is available for less than 2 years, the beta is not 
estimated). 
 
 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
As shown in table 4 the average Tobin’s Q is 1.68 with a median of 1.32. The 
average ROA is 12.48 percent with a median of 0.1293. The data shows further 
an average insider ownership of 10.49 percent for ins_t2 together and 9.30 
percent for ins. In the investigation ins_t2 represents the main variable for 
insider ownership because it is the fraction shares managers held in t-2. 
Consequently, this will mitigate possible endogeneity problems. Ins represents 
the share ownership by managers in t=0. Further, the data shows an average 
institutional ownership of 71.07 percent. 
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Table 4 – Summary statistics on main study data set 
Variable Obs Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
t_q 7684 1.680891 0.8965388 
1.32280
1 
2.05945
6 
1.23848
5 
0.00984
9 
9.92754
9 
Roa 7682 0.1247781 0.0838223 
0.12925
6 
0.18113
4 
0.12098
2 
-
1.852886 
1.38775
5 
Ins 7372 0.0930017 0.022 0.0459 0.0969 0.13457 0.0005 1 
Ins_t2 7684 0.1049066 0.024 0.0509 0.115 
0.14322
4 0.0005 1 
Itn 7075 0.7106556 0.6142 0.7671 0.87 
0.22222
2 0 0.9999 
Vs 7372 420.3973 37.17023 
95.7578
7 
250.458
2 
3025.21
9 0.0068 
94380.3
7 
vs_t2 7684 487.1396 42.57834 
106.095
4 
279.517
7 
3175.14
8 0 
103671.
9 
size 7684 7.563309 6.534479 
7.46965
4 
8.47350
8 
1.47019
7 
2.20827
4 13.5285 
leverage 7684 0.2253743 0.053051 
0.20798
2 
0.33590
7 
0.20504
6 0 
3.67550
7 
beta 7579 1.134279 0.9 1.1 1.3 
0.34800
4 0 3.05 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Correlations 
 
 
The data is not a fully balanced panel and working with unbalanced panel 
(Wooldridge, 2006)  is not necessarily an issue, if the reason for missing data is 
not correlated with the idiosyncratic errors.  The following table presents the 
correlations between the variables. As mentioned in the theoretical section, 
similarly to the findings of Geroski (1998) and McGahan (1999) the two 
variables, Tobin’s Q and the accounting profit rate ROA, are in the underlying 
data nearly uncorrelated with a value of 0.2608. 
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Table 5 – Correlations on main study data set 
  t_q roa ins ins_t2 itn vs vs_t2 size leverage beta 
t_q 1          
Roa 0.2608 1         
Ins 0.0233 
-
0.0174 1        
Ins_t2 0.0506 
-
0.0073 0.8848 1       
Itn 0.0592 0.1952 -0.207 -0.202 1      
Vs 0.0739 0.045 0.1853 0.1671 
-
0.0736 1     
vs_t2 0.0535 0.0409 0.1698 0.1996 
-
0.0734 0.9471 1    
size 
-
0.1457 0.2039 -0.23 
-
0.2409 0.1055 0.1769 0.1903 1   
leverage 
-
0.1297 
-
0.0277 
-
0.0535 
-
0.0527 -0.067 
-
0.0055 -0.008 0.2131 1  
beta 
-
0.0246 
-
0.2993 
-
0.0463 
-
0.0311 
-
0.0016 
-
0.0447 
-
0.0223 
-
0.0709 -0.0305 1 
 
 
4.4  Additional sample characteristics 
 
To analyze further the main variables of the core sample, I categorize the 
mean values in groups by insider ownership deciles, I get the values of each 
decile as shown in Table 6. One can observe low managerial ownership in 
higher capitalized companies as assumed but after decile 7 the share of insiders 
increase with the market capitalization. However, this pattern is slightly similar 
to the relationship between insider ownership and size. As nearly uncorrelated, 
Tobin’s Q and ROA show different patterns within the insider ownership 
deciles. Table 6, below, provides more values regarding the characteristics of 
the sample data. 
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Figure 3 – Market Capitalization per insider decile 
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Figure 4 – Tobin’s Q by insider decile 
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Figure 5 – ROA by insider decile 
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Figure 6 – Institutional owners’ share by insider decile 
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Figure 7 Size by insider ownership decile 
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Figure 8 – Leverage by insider ownership decile 
 
 64 
d1
d2
d3
d4
d5
d6
d7
d8
d9
d10
1.0
8
1.1
1.1
2
1.1
4
1.1
6
be
ta
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
ins
 
Figure 9 – Beta by insider ownership decile 
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Table 6 – Means for each coefficients by decile groups 
Means ins_t2 ins2_t2 ins3_t2 itn size leverage beta vs_t2 vs2_t2 t_q roa Marketcap 
d1 0.0096548 0.0000969 9.91E-07 0.6557654 9.150273 0.2604458 1.076384 240.1982 262839.7 1.548249 0.1445666 25535.71 
d2 0.0168226 0.0002888 5.05E-06 0.7401842 8.302198 0.2417739 1.128856 167.8108 123879.5 1.590044 0.1414523 9612.108 
d3 0.0250399 0.0006332 0.0000162 0.7525693 7.968822 0.2327438 1.138382 159.1914 92641.14 1.595287 0.1285016 6614.883 
d4 0.0340115 0.001165 0.0000402 0.7716909 7.725191 0.2240211 1.164763 229.0425 414039.6 1.659 0.1320345 6764.44 
d5 0.0459165 0.0021233 0.0000989 0.7666057 7.355952 0.2179972 1.168561 239.4583 1048625 1.673982 0.1131559 5601.356 
d6 0.0600651 0.0036276 0.0002203 0.7443205 7.122717 0.2287108 1.14227 193.1 503829.1 1.686771 0.1149848 2998.575 
d7 0.080284 0.0065022 0.0005312 0.7360683 7.076556 0.2341542 1.127989 224.6946 229988.5 1.705082 0.1181564 2823.793 
d8 0.11744 0.0140262 0.0017034 0.7051169 6.878476 0.2080612 1.16511 359.1763 777937.7 1.683995 0.1048104 2901.62 
d9 0.2011893 0.0417116 0.0089081 0.6728078 6.978115 0.194168 1.125468 716.9425 2576989 1.890904 0.1198175 3634.332 
d10 0.4654346 0.2465477 0.1491058 0.5841787 6.933512 0.2098429 1.106776 2347.684 9.75E+07 1.787472 0.1286265 4883.978 
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5 Results 
 
This section describes the results of the investigation and the implications 
are discussed later. The underlying investigation employs 36 regressions for the 
main study and auxiliary for its robustness check.  
 
Please note that, to attain the aim of the study, the figures hereafter marked 
with an asterisk (*), explain the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the selected independent variables and the intercept only. The effect of 
other variables are not integrated in the relation, so that the dependent value 
can be depicted in different extent than the actual values. 
 
The main regressions and the robustness check regressions differ from each 
other both in the dependent variable and in the independent variable for insider 
shareholding deviations as described in the methodology section: 
 
Main regression: 
 
 Tobin’s Q, whereby lagged variables INS(n-2), VS (n-2) replaced 
INS and VS. 
 Return on assets, whereby lagged variables INS(n-2), VS (n-2) 
replaced INS and VS 
 
Primarily, the aim of this study is to analyze the results for Tobin’s Q 
whereby a possible endogeneity effect is mitigated with a lagged value for 
share insider ownership as described in the previous section. The control 
variable, return on assets, here is similarly lagged as it is the case for Tobin’s Q.  
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After analyzing these both variables with several regressions, I will continue 
with a robustness check for specifically for the institutional ownership effect 
because in the main study there are several observations without institutional 
ownership. Finally, I will make another robustness check for the results 
presented in 5.1 by ignoring the endogeneity effect in order to compare. 
5.1 Results for Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets 
 
As given above, table 10 presents the results for the regressions where 
Tobin’s Q and Return on assets are regressed as dependent variable. All 
equations include a set of two-digit industry dummies and also year dummies 
but their coefficients are not reported to save space. 
 
 
Equation 1 to Equation 6 
 
Equation 1 and equation 2 show the relationship as linear function with 
contradictory signs for the coefficients for the regression on Tobin’s Q and 
return on assets. 
 
In equation 3, the significance for a squared relation seems very high, even 
more than for the cubic relationship in equation 5. The control variable ROA, 
equation 4, shows contradictory signs for its coefficients compared to the ones 
in equation 3.  
 
Equation 5 and equation 6 present the nonlinear relationship with all three 
terms in the cubic equation is not highly significant. Anyway, the results for the 
cubic relationship are not fully corresponding to the results of Gugler, Mueller 
and Yurtoglu (2008) but the pattern of signs corresponds in the same way to a 
cubic relationship rather as MSV estimation of a piece-wise linear regression.  
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The regression results on return on asset have contradictory signs to the ones on 
Tobin’s Q but in this case the coefficients for Tobin’s Q are not significant. 
 
 
Figure 10* – Equation 3: INS and INS2 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Figure 11* – Equation 5 : INS, INS2 and INS3 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
 
On analyzing the turning points for insider ownership in these equations we 
see that for the inversed u shaped relation in equation 3 the maximum is at the 
level of 60.93 percent. This is corresponding to the maximum level in the cubic 
relation given in equation 5 but nevertheless the minimum in this equation is at 
the level of 88.42 percent.  
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Equation 7 to Equation 10 
 
The equations 7 to 10 present the effect of purely by institutional ownership. 
There is a strongly significant positive relationship observable on both Tobin’s 
Q and return on assets as equation 7 and equation 8 present. In equation 9 and 
10 we additionally involve INS2 as insider ownership square. As expected the 
second coefficient for both 9 and 10 is negative but also notably at an 
insignificant level also for both. Further, if we compare these coefficients here 
with the one of the previous equations it is remarkable that the sign for the 
regressions of Tobin’s Q and return on assets do not contradict as previously in 
equation 1 to 6. 
 
The linear relation between insider ownership and firm value is highly 
significant which leads to a theoretical maximum level at 100 percent 
institutional ownership. However, this would even exceed by analyzing the 
mathematical maximum which is at the level of 125.04 percent which obviously 
does not contribute to the study. 
 
Equation 11 to Equation 18 
 
Equations 11 to 16 take the independent variables for both insider 
ownership and institutional ownership together and add further control 
variables as size, leverage, and beta. In this group of equation, I employ a cubic 
relationship for insider ownership and the company value. Thus, given that the 
insider ownership and firm value is explained as cubic, all coefficients for 
insider ownership do not significantly contribute to Tobin’s Q. Comparing the 
effects of institutional ownership in the equation 7 to 10 and here we see that 
there is a slight decrease in the coefficient ITN and a slight increase in ITN2b by 
adding further variables into the relation. The coefficients for ITN and ITN2 do 
not show nor an important increase and decrease but still its significance level 
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increases with more dependent variables in the regression.  The pattern on ROA 
is different, there coefficient in equation 12 is in a similar level as in 6 but by 
adding control variables it decreases from a level in equation 12 of 0.1362 for 
ITN to 0.0663 in 14 and to 0.0597 in 16. 
 
The size contributes a highly significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q 
similarly as leverage whereby the coefficient for leverage is much higher than 
for size. Its effect on ROA is slightly different. Here we have again a negative 
effect by leverage on the dependent variable but a positive one with 
considerably higher significance by the firm size. Beta contributes in equation 
15 and equation 16 a negative value to both Tobin’s Q and ROA whereby its 
significance is not given for Tobin’s Q but it plays an even bigger role on return 
on assets. Compared to size and leverage it contributes in a much more 
importantly way to ROA. In equation 16, its coefficient with -0.1036 is more 
than as twice high as the leverage with -0.0436. 
 
Equation 17 and equation 18 point out further the effects merely given by 
the control variables size, leverage and beta. Both equations show similar 
results as given by equation 15 and equation 16. 
 
Turning points vary much between equation 11, and the other in equation 
13 and 15 in the relation between insider ownership and Tobin’s Q. Equation 11 
shows a maximum at 67.63, and a negative minimum. Equation 13 has 
minimum at 8.07 percent and a maximum at 72.01 percent. Similarly with 
equation 15 which shows a minimum at 7.96 percent and a maximum at 72.98 
percent of insider ownership. For insider ownership range between 0 and 100 
percent, it shows more a squared picture of relationship rather than a cubic one 
as given as in equation 13 and 15. However, this pattern results from the 
insignificant coefficients. 
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Figure 12* – Equation 11: INS, INS2 and INS3 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Figure 13* - Equation 13: INS, INS2 and INS3 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
 
From equation 11 to equation 18, the turning points for institutional 
ownership lie out of the range of 0 and 100 percent. Further, the coefficients for 
institutional ownership are given in an insignificant level. 
 
Equation 19 to Equation 22 
 
Equation 19 and equation 20 show for the coefficient INS a strongly 
significant positive effect on the dependent variable. Whereby, institutional 
ownership effect, as split here in ITN and ITN2, does not show any significance 
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for both coefficients. The control variables size, leverage and beta continue the 
same pattern as described above. 
 
Equation 21 and 22 differs from the previous two because of the two added 
coefficient VS and VS2 which measure the wealth effect of the insider owners. 
In equation 21, where the regression is made on Tobin’s Q, we can easily 
observe an important change. The coefficient, however still in the same range as 
in 19, changes its sign. On the other hand, VS delivers a positive effect and VS2 
an additional but very low negative effect arising from insider ownership. 
Institutional ownership is kept in a squared relationship with the dependent 
variables. Both coefficients, ITN and ITN2, do not show any significant 
coefficients. A further remarkable point here is that the size effect on Tobin’s Q 
has increased. So did the intercept as well, it show an increase from 1.9964 to 
2.4960 in 21 for Tobin’s Q. 
 
Turning points for insiders’ wealth and institutional ownership are out of 
the range of 0 and 100 percent ownership.  
 
 
Equation 23 to equation 28 
 
Equation 23 and equation 24 differs from the previous one only by the case 
that institutional ownership is represented by only one coefficient, ITN. Thus, 
the main difference in here is that institutional ownership shows highly 
significant positive coefficients in both regressions. The coefficients for insider 
ownership INS, VS and VS2 do not show significant changes. 
 
In the equations 25 to 28, insider ownership is described to have a cubic 
relation with firm value, without the VS and VS2 coefficients for the insider 
wealth. For INS and INS3, the signs are negative and for INS2 positive. This 
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pattern describing the effect of insider ownership is the case on both Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. The effect by institutional investors is given by the ITN still which is 
positive for Tobin’s Q and ROA. The effect by the control variables continue to 
hold the same pattern and do not change significantly. 
 
For equation 23 and 24, insider ownership turning points are not given as it 
is measure with INS only. Turning points arising from the effect of insider 
ownership on firm value are given for the cubic relation from equation 25 to 28. 
Yet both on Tobin’s Q and return on assets, coefficients are not significant. 
Further, as above stated for shareholder wealth in equation 20 and 21, the 
turning points for shareholder wealth is out of the range of 0 and 100 percent 
ownership. For institutional ownership, there are no turning points because as 
simply represented by only one variable, ITN, from equation 23 to equation 28. 
 
The coefficients for insider ownership in equation 25 and 27 on Tobin’s Q 
are not significant but the turning points are very close. Maximum points are 
the same for 25 and 27 with 72.86 percent insider ownership. The minimum for 
equation 25 is at 7.62 percent and for equation 27 at 7.55 percent insider 
ownership. For the turning points in relation to ROA in equation 26 and 28, 
closeness is observable. 
 
 
Figure 14* – Equation 25: INS, INS2 and INS3 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
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Equation 29 to equation 32 
 
In equation 29 and equation 30 we have the variable INS, VS and VS2 
representing its effect on firm value. Again, we have a negative coefficient for 
INS and positive VS and negative VS2 similar as for the ones as above described 
for equation 23 but the existing insignificant effect by VS and VS2 on ROA is 
further decreasing in the significance level. Beta has not been taken into account 
for the equations 29 and 30. Its effect was nevertheless insignificant for Tobin’s 
Q. The size effect on Tobin’s Q nearly doubled even with higher significance to 
-0.1299. The effect of leverage on Tobin’s Q decreased to -0.5865. 
 
In equation 31 and equation 32 the effect of insider ownership is solely 
represented by INS. It shows a highly significant positive coefficient on Tobin’s 
and ROA. As institutional ownership is represented by INS only, as before, 
there are no remarkable changes on its effect.  The effect emerging from the 
control variables are as in equation 29 and 30. 
 
Shareholder wealth shows here the similar pattern as in the above explained 
situation in equation 21 to 24. 
 
Equation 33 to equation 36 
 
In equation 33 and 34 the effect of all variables has been taken into account. 
Insider ownership shows here a clear cubic relation with Tobin’s Q and also 
with ROA. INS, INS3 and VS2 have negative coefficients whereas INS2 and VS 
have positive coefficients.  Institutional ownership represented by ITN and 
ITN2 do not show significant coefficient neither on Tobin’s Q nor on ROA. Size 
has shows further significant negative effect on Tobin’s and a positive one on 
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ROA. Leverage has significant negative effect on both Tobin’s and ROA. The 
effect of Beta on Tobin’s Q remains negatively but still insignificant but on ROA 
it shows a significant negative effect. 
 
Equation 35 and equation 36 employ the same coefficients for insider 
ownership but only one for institutional ownership. Compared to equations 33 
and 34 the rest of the variables remain the same. The effect by its coefficients 
and its significances remain similar on Tobin’s Q. The insider ownership effect 
on ROA is not significant for INS as in equation 34.  In this equation the 
difference is on the institutional ownership which is represented by only one 
variable, ITN. The coefficient is slightly higher than in equation 33 but its 
significance has arisen to a very important level. The same is observable with its 
relation on ROA.  
 
Turning points for insider ownership represented by the variables INS, INS2 
and INS3, are very close together in the relation on both Tobin’s and return on 
assets. Equation 33 shows a minimum at 24.45 percent, corresponding to the 
minimum of insider ownership in equation 35 with 24.58 percent. The 
maximum in equation 33 is at the level of 59.13 percent, also corresponding to 
the one in equation 35 with 59.19 percent. The maximum for 34 and 35 is at 
60.62 percent and 60.92 percent respectively. The minimum is given at 6.21 
percent and 7.38 percent respectively. 
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Figure 15* – Equation 33: INS, INS2 and INS3 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
Figure 16* - Equation 35: INS, INS2 and INS3 in relation with Tobin’s Q 
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Figure 17* – Equation 35: Institutional Ownership in relation with Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Figure 18* – Eq. 36, Institutional Ownership in relation with ROA 
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Table 7 – Regressions for Tobin’s Q (Q) and Return on assets (ROA). 
  Ins  Ins2  Ins3  Itn  Itn2  Size  Leverage  Beta  VS  VS2  Intercept R² # Obs. 
1 Q 0.406633 4.31                   1.638232 0.1208 7684 
2 ROA -0.02362 -2.24                   0.127256 0.0748 7682 
3 Q 0.827361 3.46 -0.67898 -2.07                 1.615494 0.1212 7684 
4 ROA -0.09671 -3.62 0.117945 3.05                 0.131205 0.0761 7682 
5 Q 1.012271 2.15 -1.40252 -0.87 0.625882 0.47               1.608883 0.1212 7684 
6 ROA -0.32915 -6.61 1.027344 5.68 -0.78661 5.01               0.139514 0.0798 7682 
7 Q       0.346412 5.19             1.452968 0.1206 7075 
8 ROA       0.104408 10.2             0.049794 0.1079 7073 
9 Q       0.625166 2.62 -0.24998 -1.17           1.39346 0.1208 7075 
10 ROA       0.126242 3.25 -0.01957 -0.66           0.200538 0.108 7073 
11 Q 0.894479 1.84 -0.58273 -0.35 -0.07744 -0.06 0.467247 1.94 -0.04185 -0.19           1.314608 0.124 7075 
12 ROA -0.364 -7.19 1.28074 6.87 -1.00712 -6.23 0.136208 3.53 -0.02485 -0.85           0.054814 0.1154 7073 
13 Q -0.36444 -0.71 2.510052 1.48 -2.08956 -1.52 0.537565 2.23 -0.09786 -0.45 -0.06635 -5.27 -0.68257 -4.43       2.019285 0.1408 7075 
14 ROA -0.04204 -0.8 0.453804 2.4 -0.4479 -2.78 0.066239 1.87 0.028004 1.02 0.020694 12.4 -0.04163 -2.75       -0.08948 0.1121 7073 
15 Q -0.32257 -0.62 2.247728 1.32 -1.85152 -1.34 0.497357 2.02 -0.06692 -0.31 -0.06185 -4.86 -0.79381 -5.14 -0.00659 -0.14     2.035074 0.1434 6979 
16 ROA -0.02129 -0.42 0.323668 1.79 -0.33067 -2.16 0.059736 1.7 0.032602 1.21 0.019851 12.2 -0.04359 -3.11 -0.10356 -20.3     0.036879 0.2299 6977 
17 Q           -0.06704 -6.01 -0.6981 -4.97 -0.04045 -0.89     2.397011 0.1374 7529 
18 ROA           0.019055 12.3 -0.04532 -3.45 -0.10189 -19.9     0.106612 0.1938 7577 
19 Q 0.297092 2.99     0.473375 1.93 -0.05317 -0.24 -0.05834 -4.86 -0.79642 -5.16 -0.00806 -0.17     1.996411 0.1432 6979 
20 ROA 0.038888 3.67     0.061598 1.75 0.029235 1.08 0.019892 12.9 -0.04417 -3.15 -0.10382 -20.2     0.036161 0.2289 6977 
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  Ins  Ins2  Ins3  Itn  Itn2  Size  Leverage  Beta  VS  VS2  Intercept R² # Obs. 
21 Q -0.32191 -2.85     0.338608 1.4 0.114825 0.53 -0.12558 -9.18 -0.69202 -4.63 -0.02369 -0.51 0.000187 7.39 -1.9E-09 -6.31 2.496007 0.1652 6979 
22 ROA 0.03282 2.66     0.059587 1.68 0.031 1.14 0.019259 10.9 -0.04292 -3.02 -0.10415 -20.3 2.38E-06 1.95 -3.4E-11 -2.45 0.041322 0.2295 6977 
23 Q -0.32989 -294     0.466163 6.73   -0.12592 -9.19 -0.68971 -4.63 -0.02326 -0.5 0.000186 7.4 -1.9E-09 -6.31 2.471605 0.1651 6979 
24 ROA 0.030668 2.43     0.094035 9.9   0.019168 10.8 -0.04229 -2.97 -0.10404 -20.2 2.27E-06 1.9 -3.3E-11 -2.42 0.034719 0.2293 6977 
25 Q -0.33698 -0.66 2.467703 1.45 -2.07173 -1.51 0.429199 6.24   -0.06572 -5.21 -0.68481 -4.46       2.035907 0.1408 7075 
26 ROA -0.04992 -0.95 0.466 2.48 -0.45305 -2.82 0.097259 9.92   0.020515 12.1 -0.04099 -2.7       -0.09425 0.1589 7073 
27 Q -0.30352 -0.59 2.2173 1.3 -1.83813 -1.33 0.422951 6.05   -0.06143 -4.82 -0.79527 -5.16 -0.00683 -0.15     2.047056 0.1434 6979 
28 ROA -0.0306 -0.6 0.338586 1.88 -0.33725 -2.21 0.095997 9.98   0.019651 12 -0.04288 -3.06 -0.10345 -20.2     0.031029 0.2296 6977 
29 Q -0.31254 -2.79     0.471616 6.93   -0.12986 -9.55 -0.58651 -3.96   0.000188 7.47 -1.9E-09 -6.36 2.439369 0.1629 7075 
30 ROA 0.043283 3.25     0.094834 9.81   0.020314 11.1 -0.04075 -2.64   1.68E-06 1.34 -2.4E-11 -1.74 -0.09394 0.1577 7073 
31 Q 0.325176      0.419607    -0.0622  -0.68685        1.991707 0.1406 7075 
32 ROA 0.04764 4.13     0.094878 9.75   0.020756 12.9 -0.04158 -2.73       -0.09701 0.1574 7073 
33 Q -2.03776 -3.66 5.889753 3.24 -4.69795 -3.1 0.408922 1.68 0.072147 0.33 -0.13832 -9.25 -0.68172 -4.58 -0.02062 -0.44 0.000194 7.32 -2E-09 -6.27 2.627222 0.1665 6979 
34 ROA -0.0424 -0.78 0.376305 2.03 -0.37539 -2.39 0.057853 1.64 0.03448 1.27 0.019023 10.1 -0.04206 -2.95 -0.1039 -20.4 2.79E-06 2.21 -3.9E-11 -2.73 0.043791 0.2307 6977 
35 Q -2.05639 -3.7 5.918457 3.26 -4.70916 -3.11 0.489076 6.98   -0.13868 -9.26 -0.68027 -4.58 -0.02035 -0.43 0.000194 7.33 -2E-09 -6.27 2.613695 0.1664 6979 
36 ROA -0.05133 -0.95 0.39012 2.11 -0.38081 -2.43 0.096172 10.08   0.018851 9.87 -0.04136 -2.9 -0.10377 -20.24 2.68E-06 2.17 -3.8E-11 -2.7 0.037312 0.2304 6977 
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5.2 Robustness Check 
 
Here, I would to check for major change in the regression output in different 
conditions. 
 
First, I will analyze the results for the insignificant relation of institutional 
ownership and firm value. As the used data includes observations with zero 
institutional ownership, I will limit all observations with a given institutional 
ownership. 
 
Second, as insider ownership of t-2 has been used to mitigate possible 
endogeneity, be the output without respect to the endogeneity issue might 
deliver interesting conclusions. 
 
 
Robustness Check: 
 
5.2.1: Robustness check for ownership by institutional investors 
 Selected regressions, whereby only observations with institutional 
ownership not equal to 0 are taken into account. 
 
5.2.2: Similar regressions as in 5.1 but without mitigating endogeneity issue 
 Tobin’s Q, whereby insider ownership coefficient from same year 
 Return on assets, whereby insider ownership coefficient from same 
year 
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5.2.1 Robustness on Institutional Ownership 
 
In the above part squared relationship between institutional ownership was 
not significant enough. So, focusing solely on companies with a given 
institutional ownership which is greater than 0 the below given outcome by 
table 8 will result. 
 
 
Equation 7 to equation 10 
 
For equation 7 and 8 we see just a slight increase in the coefficient and 
similarly slight increase in its coefficients. Equation 9 and equation 19 employ 
two variables, ITN and ITN2 into the regression. For both 9 and 10 we observe 
insignificant coefficients in ITN2. This pattern is not given for the equation 9* 
and 10*. For both ITN and ITN2 the level of significance increases. It shows also 
an increase in the coefficient. 
 
 
Equation 33 to equation 36 
 
Equation 33* and 34* do not show major changes for the coefficients of 
insider ownership and of control variables.  However, this is also the case for 
institutional ownership coefficients. We have only a higher coefficient for ITN 
with also higher significance level but as in equation 33 we have still 
insignificant coefficient for ITN2. In equation 34* which measures the effect on 
ROA, both ITN and ITN2 coefficient are significant which was not the case in 
equation 34. 
 
 83 
Observing equation 35* and 36* we find that the coefficient ITN affects both 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets in a stronger extend with 0.5810 instead of 
0.4891 and 0.1337 instead of 0.0962 respectively. 
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Table 8 – Institutional Ownership robustness table. Selected equations revised. 
Eq. Ins  Ins2  Ins3  Itn  Itn2  Size  Leverage  Beta  VS  VS2  Intercept R² # Obs. 
7             0.346412 5.19                         1.452968 0.1206 7075 
8           0.104408 10.2                         0.049794 0.1079 7073 
7*           0.398585 5.28                         1.408808 0.1193 6944 
8*           0.135081 10.9                         0.025936 0.1197 6942 
9             0.625166 2.62 -0.24998 -1.17                     1.39346 0.1208 7075 
10           0.126242 3.25 -0.01957 -0.66                     0.04513 0.108 7073 
9*           1.141092 3.91 -0.61767 -2.52                     1.220087 0.12 6944 
10*           0.356404 5.54 -0.18403 -3.96                     -0.03037 0.1263 6942 
33 -2.03776 -3.66 5.889753 3.24 -4.69795 -3.1 0.408922 1.68 0.072147 0.33 -0.13832 -9.25 -0.68172 -4.58 -0.02062 -0.44 0.000194 7.32 -2E-09 -6.27 2.627222 0.1665 6979 
34 -0.0424 -0.78 0.376305 2.03 -0.37539 -2.39 0.057853 1.64 0.03448 1.27 0.019023 10.1 -0.04206 -2.95 -0.1039 -20.4 2.79E-06 2.21 -3.9E-11 -2.73 0.043791 0.2307 6977 
33* -2.14077 -3.82 6.304293 3.44 -5.01111 -3.29 0.996936 3.21 -0.34462 -1.35 -0.1357 -9.01 -0.69216 -4.59 -0.02165 -0.46 0.000191 7.25 -2E-09 -6.22 2.416101 0.1657 6848 
34* -0.06787 -1.26 0.487418 2.61 -0.45919 -2.9 0.29309 4.87 -0.13202 -3.06 0.018801 10.2 -0.03791 -2.69 -0.10291 -20.4 2.48E-06 1.92 -3.4E-11 -2.33 -0.03412 0.2483 6846 
35 -2.05639 -3.7 5.918457 3.26 -4.70916 -3.11 0.489076 6.98     -0.13868 -9.26 -0.68027 -4.58 -0.02035 -0.43 0.000194 7.33 -2E-09 -6.27 2.613695 0.1664 6979 
36 -0.05133 -0.95 0.39012 2.11 -0.38081 -2.43 0.096172 10.1     0.018851 9.87 -0.04136 -2.9 -0.10377 -20.2 2.68E-06 2.17 -3.8E-11 -2.7 0.037312 0.2304 6977 
35* -2.05793 -3.68 6.117587 3.35 -4.90252 -3.22 0.580975 7.15     -0.13414 -8.89 -0.69906 -4.64 -0.02313 -0.49 0.000192 7.27 -2E-09 -6.23 2.509191 0.1655 6848 
36* -0.03595 -0.66 0.415272 2.24 -0.41714 -2.65 0.133662 11.3     0.019394 10.2 -0.0406 -2.83 -0.10346 -20.3 2.8E-06 2.2 -3.8E-11 -2.63 0.001636 0.2451 6846 
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5.2.2 Robustness without respect for endogeneity mitigation 
 
The below given table12 shows the regression results for the robustness 
check in which a possible endogeneity issue between insider ownership and 
firm value has completely been ignored. Thus, the insider ownership related 
coefficients and the firm value variables are from the same year. These insider 
ownership related coefficients are the following ones: INS, INS2, INS3, VS, VS2, 
ITN and ITN2. 
 
 
Equation 33.1 and 34.1 
 
Equation 33.1 to equation 36.1 will be the ones of key interest. The 
coefficients for insider ownership are higher but insider wealth VS seems 
slightly lower. All coefficients show also a higher significance level. Further in 
equation 33.1 and 34.1 the effect of institutional ownership, given by ITN and 
ITN2, is here as well not significant. 
 
 
Equation 35.1 and 36.1 
 
As described for equation 35 and 36 in the above part, similar way for the 
equations 35.1 and 36.1, there is only one variable, ITN, employed for the effect 
of institutional ownership.  The effect of institutional ownership remains highly 
significant with similar coefficient values. The insider ownership effect 
increases in both coefficients and its significance level. The similar pattern is 
observable for insider wealth. 
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Table 9 – Regressions without respect to potential endogeneity issues. 
 Ins  Ins2  Ins3  Itn  Itn2  Size  Leverage  Beta  VS  VS2  
Interce
pt R² Obs. 
1.1 0.381563 4.05                   
1.72817
7 
0.111
6 
1095
5 
2.1 -0.04144 
-
4.73                   
0.13564
7 
0.070
6 
1095
0 
3.1 1.230774 5.24 
-
1.35699 
-
4.23                 
1.68331
4 0.113 
1095
5 
4.1 -0.12676 
-
5.63 
0.13631
2 4.34                 
0.14015
2 
0.072
6 
1095
0 
5.1 1.936645 4.22 
-
4.11751 
-
2.61 
2.37877
7 1.85               
1.65849
8 
0.113
2 
1095
5 
6.1 -0.24494 
-
6.09 
0.59852
4 4.17 
-
0.39825 
-
3.21               
0.14430
6 
0.073
6 
1095
0 
7.1       0.361839 
5.8
2             
1.52956
7 
0.111
1 
1019
5 
8.1       0.082381 
11.
7             
0.07400
8 
0.092
5 
1019
0 
9.1       0.473881 
2.1
4 
-
0.10088 
-
0.51           
1.50543
6 
0.111
2 
1019
5 
10.
1       
0.07626
1 
3.1
4 
0.00550
8 0.28           
0.07532
7 
0.092
5 
1019
0 
11.
1 
1.86268
9 3.92 
-
3.09052 -1.9 
1.44223
6 1.09 
0.25521
9 
1.1
4 
0.18262
9 0.91           
1.38703
8 
0.115
3 
1019
5 
12.
1 -0.2765 
-
6.69 
0.84241
7 5.61 
-
0.61562 
-
4.75 
0.09374
1 
3.8
2 
-
0.01099 
-
0.56           
0.08407
3 0.097 
1019
0 
13.
1 
-
0.42018 
-
0.82 
2.45704
7 1.46 
-
2.12467 
-
1.58 
0.38196
1 
1.6
9 
0.00079
4 0 
-
0.13498 -11 
-
0.89813 
-
6.54       
2.71688
7 
0.154
5 9347 
14.
1 
-
0.07229 
-
1.62 
0.35746
9 2.23 -0.3082 
-
2.26 0.04177 
1.6
7 
0.03351
3 1.65 
0.01389
4 10.1 
-
0.02729 
-
2.25       
-
0.01502 
0.117
7 9342 
15.
1 
-
0.31416 
-
0.62 1.96949 1.18 
-
1.72553 -1.3 
0.30099
5 
1.3
1 
0.05333
8 0.26 
-
0.12497 
-
10.2 
-
1.02137 
-
7.62 
0.07326
1 1.72     
2.61580
9 
0.156
7 9183 
16.
1 
-
0.05951 -1.4 
0.28716
6 1.9 
-
0.25228 
-
1.96 
0.02189
1 0.9 
0.04800
9 2.44 0.01348 10.2 
-
0.03426 
-
3.03 
-
0.09251 
-
21.7     0.10052 
0.181
5 9178 
17.
1           -0.1328 
-
12.3 
-
0.90985 
-
7.26 
0.04943
5 1.19     
2.90109
7 
0.154
3 9924 
18.
1           
0.01298
8 10.4 
-
0.03107 
-
2.93 
-
0.09122 
-
21.6     
0.14351
7 
0.156
4 9919 
 87 
 Ins  Ins2  Ins3  Itn  Itn2  Size  Leverage  Beta  VS  VS2  
Interce
pt R² Obs. 
19.
1 
0.17363
6 1.77     
0.28452
5 
1.2
6 0.05974 0.3 -0.1227 
-
10.6 
-
1.02247 
-
7.62 
0.07173
6 1.68     
2.59211
1 
0.156
5 9183 
20.
1 
0.01126
9 1.25     
0.01958
4 
0.8
2 
0.04884
7 2.53 
0.01380
6 10.8 
-
0.03444 
-
3.04 
-
0.09273 
-
21.7     
0.09711
7 
0.181
1 9178 
21.
1 
-
0.89005 
-
7.85     
0.00307
8 
0.0
1 0.35603 1.83 
-
0.23493 
-
17.4 
-
0.81859 
-
6.51 0.09028 2.2 
0.00037
4 
10.
5 
-3.9E-
09 
-
8.64 
3.38417
6 
0.214
7 9183 
22.
1 -0.0062 -0.6     0.01446 
0.6
1 
0.05383
5 2.78 
0.01197
7 8.44 
-
0.03094 
-
2.71 
-
0.09249 
-
21.5 
6.57E-
06 
5.1
3 
-7.6E-
11 
-
5.24 
0.11026
3 
0.183
5 9178 
23.
1 
-
0.91499 
-
8.11     0.39662 
6.3
3   
-
0.23597 
-
17.5 
-
0.81125 
-
6.46 
0.09127
8 2.22 
0.00037
2 
10.
5 
-3.9E-
09 
-
8.65 
3.30926
3 
0.214
4 9183 
24.
1 
-
0.00999 
-
0.97     0.07399 
10.
3   
0.01182
3 8.34 
-
0.02984 
-
2.63 
-
0.09235 
-
21.5 
6.35E-
06 
5.0
4 
-7.4E-
11 
-
5.17 
0.09890
7 
0.182
7 9178 
25.
1 
-
0.42047 
-
0.83 2.45756 1.46 
-
2.12493 
-
1.59 
0.38283
6 
5.9
5   
-
0.13499 -11 
-
0.89812 
-
6.55       
2.71675
7 
0.154
5 9347 
26.
1 
-
0.08417 
-
1.94 
0.37897
5 2.39 
-
0.31898 
-
2.35 
0.07872
2 
10.
6   0.01367 10 
-
0.02651 -2.2       
-
0.02054 
0.117
4 9342 
27.
1 
-
0.33322 
-
0.66 
2.00472
6 1.21 
-
1.74365 
-
1.31 
0.35990
9 
5.5
3   
-
0.12532 
-
10.2 
-
1.02012 
-
7.55 
0.07344
2 1.72     
2.60672
3 
0.156
7 9183 
28.
1 
-
0.07663 
-
1.86 
0.31865
7 2.14 
-
0.26838 
-
2.11 
0.07493
9 
10.
3   
0.01316
4 10 
-
0.03315 
-
2.95 
-
0.09235 
-
21.6     
0.09231
4 
0.180
8 9178 
29.
1 
-
0.89117 
-
7.77     
0.41591
2 
6.7
1   
-
0.24484 
-
18.2 -0.7024 
-
5.59   
0.00037
6 
10.
5 
-3.9E-
09 
-
8.66 
3.43511
8 
0.212
3 9347 
30.
1 -0.0051 
-
0.46     
0.07774
2 
10.
6   
0.01204
7 8.18 
-
0.02284 
-
1.88   
7.55E-
06 
5.5
4 
-8.5E-
11 
-
5.58 
-
0.01251 
0.119
8 9342 
31.
1 
0.20186
6 2.05     
0.37181
7 
5.8
4   
-
0.13198 
-
11.4 
-
0.89932 
-
6.56       
2.68045
1 
0.154
3 9347 
32.
1 
0.01583
4 1.65     
0.07718
3 
10.
5   
0.01419
5 10.8 
-
0.02672 
-
2.21       
-
0.02697 
0.116
7 9342 
33.
1 -3.6835 -7 
9.79989
8 5.64 
-
7.90768 
-
5.26 
0.13332
8 
0.6
1 
0.27042
5 1.38 
-
0.25592 
-
17.4 
-
0.80278 
-
6.43 
0.09841
9 2.4 0.00039 
10.
7 
-4.1E-
09 
-
8.75 
3.58817
8 
0.217
7 9183 
34.
1 
-
0.11954 
-
2.66 
0.43229
9 2.77 
-
0.36943 
-
2.78 
0.01832
6 
0.7
6 
0.05209
2 2.65 
0.01121
2 7.46 
-
0.03027 
-
2.65 
-
0.09214 
-
21.5 
7.26E-
06 
5.4
8 
-8.4E-
11 
-
5.55 
0.11760
2 
0.184
4 9178 
35.
1 
-
3.77304 
-
7.26 
9.96172
4 5.76 
-
7.98616 
-
5.33 
0.43189
8 
6.8
5   
-
0.25744 
-
17.5 
-
0.79693 -6.4 
0.09928
9 2.42 
0.00038
9 
10.
7 
-4.1E-
09 
-
8.75 
3.54020
3 
0.217
6 9183 
36.
1 
-
0.13675 
-
3.11 
0.46321
9 3 
-
0.38431 
-
2.91 
0.07586
2 
10.
5   
0.01092
3 7.29 
-
0.02915 
-
2.57 
-
0.09197 
-
21.5 
7.11E-
06 5.4 
-8.2E-
11 
-
5.48 
0.10832
9 
0.183
6 9178 
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6 Discussion 
 
The results presented in section 5.1 convey prevalent outcomes for the 
equation 35 and 36. Therefore, I will analyze these two equation in detail. 
 
According to Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu (2008) the variables INS, INS2, INS3 
capture the entrenchment effect of insider ownership whereas the wealth effect 
is captured by the variables VS, and VS2. 
 
Based on the means as in table 6, section 4, I will try to merge the separated 
entrenchment effect with the wealth effect and describe its cumulated 
relationship with firm value measured both by Tobin’s Q and return on assets. 
Later the relationship between each the variables with the insider ownership 
variables within each decile will be discussed. 
 
 
6.1 Review on the results for Tobin’s Q  
 
The product of table 6 and equation 35 is given below in table 10. The table 
shows the total effect of each coefficient on Tobin’s Q. 
 
The aim here is to analyze the cumulative effect of insider ownership, so I 
take the values for the coefficients INS, INS2, INS3, VS and VS2 together from 
Table 6 and use it with the coefficient values of equation 35 to get the total 
function for insider ownership as following: 
 
-0.685632827x + 5.085333737x2 - 5.135149834x3 + 2.613695 
 
Based on the above function I get the following relationship:  
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Figure 19* – Equation 35 Insider ownership cumulated in relation to Tobin’s Q 
 
The figure above shows the relationship between insider ownership and 
Tobin’s Q. The local minimum is given at the level of 7.62 percent of insider 
ownership. The local maximum is given at 58.40 percent of insider ownership. 
This relationship describes clearly a initial entrenchment effect until an insider 
ownership of 7.62 percent which is followed by the  managers’ incentive effect 
to an insider ownership level of 58.40 percent. Finally after 58.40 percent of 
insider ownership the entrenchment effect lasts. 
 
The results are corresponding to the hypothesis that the ownership structure 
of equity has an important influence on firm value. They are consistent with the 
common prediction by Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny of a nonlinear relation 
between firm value and the fraction of shares held by managers. The results are 
also consistent with the more specific prediction by Stulz (1988) of a curvilinear 
relation between the fraction of shares controlled by managers and with the 
efficient-monitoring hypothesis of Pound (1988) which predicts a positive 
relation between corporate performance and the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors. 
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The two figures below describe both an increase in the wealth effect of 
insiders and entrenchment effect of insiders with a higher insider ownership 
decile. 
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Figure 20 – Insiders’ alignment effect by insider ownership decile 
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Figure 21 – Insiders’ entrenchment effect by insider ownership decile 
 
By taking the means together with the coefficients into considerations I 
continue with analyzing equation 35. The figure below shows the total effect of 
insider ownership for each insider ownership decile. Here, it seems that 2 
 92 
groups out of 10 contribute to firm value, whereas one group seems neither to 
contribute nor to entrench but 7 groups show management entrenchment. 
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Figure 22 – The cumulated effect of the insiders on Tobin’s Q within each decile of insider 
ownership. 
 
However, the suggestion of McConnell and Servaes (1990) that institutional 
ownership reinforces the positive effect of insider ownership on corporate value 
is questionable because our results do not increase the intercept by adding 
institutional ownership (ITN) and institutional ownership squared (ITN2) as 
independent variables along with INS, INS2 and INS3. Here we observe a 
decrease in the intercept from 1.6585 to 1.3870 in type (a) and again a fall from 
1.6088 to 1.3146 in equation 11. The decrease of the intercept is also the case if 
we include just one coefficient, ITN, for institutional investors, the intercept is at 
1.3236. However, if we include all control variables to our regression, as given 
in equation 35, this will change. The intercept as above mentioned increases to 
2.6137.  
 
The figure below, Figure 14, show the effect of institutional investors to 
Tobin’s Q. From decile 1 to decile 4, an increase of the positive effect of 
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institutional owners are notable but after that point this effect diminishes with 
higher share of insider ownership 
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Figure 23 – Institutional Investors effect by insider ownership decile 
 
The figure below demonstrates the cumulated effect of insider ownership 
with regard to institutional ownership for each decile class. The incentive effect 
of management ownership is the coincides with a lower institutional ownership 
incentive except for decile class 2. The rest show that a higher effect of 
institutional ownership coincides with the entrenchment effect of insider 
ownership. However, this is not enough to set further assumptions. 
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Figure 24 - Insider Ownership total effect in relation to the effect of institutional 
ownership given in decile classes for insider ownership 
 
The figure also describes that the effect of institutional ownership to the firm 
value is much higher than the cumulated effect of insider ownership.  
 
Further, as given in equation 35 size with a coefficient of -0.1387, curbs the 
firm value.  In the decile group 1, size has his highest negative effect with a 
value of -1.2689. Though, this negative effect decreases with higher deciles for 
insider ownership. 
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Figure 25 – Size effect in relation to insider ownership 
 
After size, the leverage has the highest diminishing effect to firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. The figure below shows that in the first decile it is at 
his highest diminishing level which decreases slightly with the next decile 
groups.  
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Figure 26 – Leverage effect to Tobin’s in relation with insider ownership 
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Beta has a much lower effect on Tobin’s Q. Here, there is no clear pattern 
remarkable. Nevertheless, in our main equation, beside its low coefficient, beta 
is represented in insignificant level. 
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Figure 27 – Beta effect on Tobin’s Q in relation to insider ownership 
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Table 10 – Means as given by Table 5 multiplied by the coefficients as given in equation 35 
Eq. 35 ins ins2 ins3 itn size leverage beta vs_t2m vs2_t2m intercept    
 -2.056394 5.918457 -4.709158 0.4890757 -0.138678 -0.680273 -0.020346 0.0001935 -2.00E-09 2.613695    
           ins_ent ins_ali ins_cum 
d1 -0.019854 0.0005735 -4.67E-06 0.3207189 -1.268939 -0.177174 -0.0219 0.0464784 -0.000526  
-
0.019285 0.0459527 0.026667 
d2 -0.034594 0.0017093 -2.38E-05 0.3620061 -1.15133 -0.164472 -0.022968 0.0324714 -0.000248  
-
0.032908 0.0322236 -0.00068 
d3 -0.051492 0.0037476 -7.63E-05 0.3680634 -1.105098 -0.158329 -0.023162 0.0308035 -0.000185  
-
0.047821 0.0306183 -0.0172 
d4 -0.069941 0.006895 -0.000189 0.3774153 -1.071312 -0.152395 -0.023698 0.0443197 -0.000828  
-
0.063235 0.0434916 -0.01974 
d5 -0.094422 0.0125667 -0.000466 0.3749282 -1.020107 -0.148298 -0.023776 0.0463352 -0.002097  
-
0.082321 0.0442379 -0.03808 
d6 -0.123518 0.0214698 -0.001037 0.3640291 -0.987762 -0.155586 -0.023241 0.0373649 -0.001008  
-
0.103085 0.0363572 -0.06673 
d7 -0.165096 0.038483 -0.002502 0.3599931 -0.981361 -0.159289 -0.02295 0.0434784 -0.00046  
-
0.129114 0.0430184 -0.0861 
d8 -0.241503 0.0830135 -0.008022 0.3448555 -0.953891 -0.141538 -0.023705 0.0695006 -0.001556  
-
0.166511 0.0679447 -0.09857 
d9 -0.413724 0.2468683 -0.04195 0.3290539 -0.967709 -0.132087 -0.022899 0.1387284 -0.005154  
-
0.208806 0.1335744 -0.07523 
d10 -0.957117 1.459182 -0.702163 0.2857076 -0.961523 -0.14275 -0.022519 0.4542769 -0.195  
-
0.200098 0.2592769 0.059179 
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6.2 Review on the results on Return on Assets 
 
As above for Tobin’s Q, similarly table 11 shows the product of Table 6 and 
equation 36. The table represents the effect of each coefficient by insider 
ownership decile on ROA. So, the aim is to analyze the cumulative effect of 
insider ownership, represented by INS, INS2, INS3, VS and VS2, to firm value, 
which is here measured by return on assets. Cumulating the results for insider 
ownership I get the following function: 
 
-0.032258552x + 0.3821408x2 -0.415267x3 + 0.0373124 
 
The above given function show the following relationship between insider 
ownership and return on assets: 
 
 
Figure 28* – Equation 36: Insider ownership cumulated in relation to ROA 
 
The relationship between insider ownership and return on assets is 
characterized by a local minimum at the level of 4.57 percent of insider 
ownership as illustrated in the above figure. A maximum is at the level of 56.78 
percent of insider ownership. Compared with figure 19, the pattern is similar on 
return on assets. The initial entrenchment effect until the insider ownership 
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level of 4.57 percent changes to the incentive effect until 56.78 percent. After this 
level of insider shareholdings the entrenchment effect lasts. 
 
The three figures below describe the relation between insider ownership 
with insiders’ wealth and entrenchment and both of them cumulated. Figure 29, 
contradictory as above to Tobin’s Q, shows a rise of insider entrenchment until 
decile 7 but however afterwards it diminishes and becomes also positive with 
decile 9 and 10. 
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Figure 29 – Insiders’ entrenchment effect to ROA within each decile 
 
The insiders’ wealth effect on ROA, however, shows a zigzag relationship 
until decile 6 which afterwards rises with higher insider ownership. 
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Figure 30 – Insiders’ alignment effect within each decile 
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Figure 31 – The cumulative effect on ROA  by the insider decile. 
 
 
 
The below above demonstrates the cumulated effect of insider ownership on 
return on assets with regard to institutional ownership for each decile class. The 
incentive effect of management ownership is the coincides with the lowest 
institutional ownership incentive effects as d1, d9, d10 show. The rest show that 
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a higher effect of institutional ownership coincides with. the entrenchment 
effect of insider ownership. This case shows that the effects on ROA by insiders 
and institutional investors are also similar as the effects as shown above to 
Tobin’s Q. 
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Figure 32 – Cumulated effect by insider ownership in relation with the effect of 
institutional ownership by insider decile. 
 
 
The figure below demonstrates the effect of institutional ownership to 
return on assets for each decile of insider ownership. First, there is a strong 
increase from the first to the 4th decile, after that the positive effect diminishes 
with higher insider ownership stake. 
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Figure 33 – Institutional ownership effect to ROA by insider decile. 
For ROA, the size effect plays the most important role among the variables. 
However, contradictory to its negative effect on Tobin’s Q, size shows 
demonstrates a positive effect on return on assets. This effect is at its highest 
point with the lowest insider ownership stake. With higher stake of insider 
ownership this positive size effect decreases. After d8, insider ownership stake 
of 11.74 percent, the size effect keeps about the same level. 
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Figure 34 – The size effect on ROA by insider decile 
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The return on assets is negatively affected by leverage as shown in the 
below figure. However, here we can also assume the negative leverage effect is 
decreasing with higher insider ownership stake level. 
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Figure 35 - Leverage effect on ROA by insider decile 
 
Beta on the other hand shows much a zigzag relationship. However, the 
impact seems important but still insignificant for ROA as also for Tobin’s Q. 
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Figure 36 – Beta effect on ROA by insider decile 
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Table 11 - Means as given by Table 5 multiplied by the coefficients as given in equation 36 
Eq. 36 ins ins2 ins3 itn size leverage Beta vs vs2 
intercept 
/ roa 
   
 -0.0513339 0.3901201 -0.38081 0.0961721 0.018851 -0.041362 -0.103772 2.68E-06 -3.80E-11 0.0373124 ins_ent ins_ali ins_cum 
d1 -0.000495619 3.78E-05 -3.77E-07 0.0630663 0.1724918 -0.010773 -0.111698628 0.0006437 -9.99E-06  -0.000458 0.0006337 0.0001755 
d2 -0.00086357 0.0001127 -1.92E-06 0.0711851 0.1565047 -0.01 -0.117143758 0.0004497 -4.71E-06  -0.000753 0.000445 -0.000308 
d3 -0.001285396 0.000247 -6.17E-06 0.0723762 0.1502203 -0.009627 -0.118132291 0.0004266 -3.52E-06  -0.001045 0.0004231 -0.000621 
d4 -0.001745943 0.0004545 -1.53E-05 0.0742151 0.1456276 -0.009266 -0.120869903 0.0006138 -1.57E-05  -0.001307 0.0005981 -0.000709 
d5 -0.002357073 0.0008283 -3.77E-05 0.0737261 0.1386671 -0.009017 -0.121264029 0.0006417 -3.98E-05  -0.001566 0.0006019 -0.000964 
d6 -0.003083376 0.0014152 -8.39E-05 0.0715829 0.1342703 -0.00946 -0.118535757 0.0005175 -1.91E-05  -0.001752 0.0004984 -0.001254 
d7 -0.004121291 0.0025366 -0.000202 0.0707892 0.1334002 -0.009685 -0.117053787 0.0006022 -8.74E-06  -0.001787 0.0005934 -0.001193 
d8 -0.006028653 0.0054719 -0.000649 0.0678126 0.1296662 -0.008606 -0.120905911 0.0009626 -2.96E-05  -0.001205 0.000933 -0.000272 
d9 -0.010327831 0.0162725 -0.003392 0.0647053 0.1315444 -0.008031 -0.116792178 0.0019214 -9.79E-05  0.0025524 0.0018235 0.0043759 
d10 -0.023892573 0.0961832 -0.056781 0.0561817 0.1307036 -0.00868 -0.11485247 0.0062918 -0.003705  0.0155096 0.0025868 0.0180964 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The relationship between ownership and firm value has been studied 
widely. However, the results of different studies are not consistent with each 
other. In this study I have investigated the relationship of insider ownership 
and institutional ownership with firm value. By doing so, I have tried to 
separate the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative 
entrenchment effect. This has been done by adding additional coefficients 
capturing  insiders’ wealth in to the equation. 
 
The main measure which I have used for firm performance is Tobin’s Q, 
which is the measure of average performance – average Q. However, Marginal 
Q would have been suitable but this could not be used due to insufficient 
information in the data set. To mitigate the endogeneity effect of insider 
ownership, I have used a lagged variable for insider ownership which 
represents the fraction of shares owned two years ago by management. 
 
The study highlights that ownership structure affects firm value. On 
separating the wealth effect and entrenchment effect of insider ownership, the 
results show without exception that the wealth effect is positive and significant 
and the entrenchment effect is negative and significant. However, the same 
equations show some exceptions to return on assets which has been used as an 
alternative variable with respect to firm performance. The relationship between 
managerial shareholdings and firm performance is given by a cubic relationship 
which demonstrates a convergence of interest with outside shareholders.  
 
On combining wealth and entrenchment effect of insider ownership, I found 
that until there is insider ownership of 7.62 percent there is a decrease in 
Tobin’s Q. Between 7.62 percent and 58.40 percent, an increase in Tobin’s Q 
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which corresponds to the alignment effect on insider ownership. After 58.40 
percent I find again an entrenchment effect. The same effect is also the case with 
return on assets. The return on assets initially decreases to with increasing 
ownership until 4.57 percent and rises after-wards until its peak at 56.78 percent 
of insider ownership. Then the entrenchment effect pulls the return on assets 
down. 
 
In general, the share of institutional owners contributes in a much higher 
extent to the firm value compared to the fraction of shares held by insiders. The 
predominance of institutional ownership conveys interesting developments in 
the capital markets. The monitoring and disciplinary activities through 
institutional owners lead to increase the firm value. Consequently, the 
ownership by institutional investors shows a significant positive effect on firm 
value. However, I found out that the relation between institutional ownership 
and firm value is rather a linear relation than a squared one. 
 
The study describes a negative size effect on Tobin’s Q but a positive one on 
ROA in which the severity of both decreases with a higher stake of insider 
ownership. The negative effect of leverage on both Tobin’s Q and ROA shows  a 
similar pattern. So does the negative effect of beta too. 
 
This study investigated the US equity market which is characterized by 
highly dispersed ownership. Further research in markets where the ownership 
is more concentrated would contribute to the literature. Additionally to that, the 
effects of different owner identities on firmvalue in such markets are another 
interesting point which could be evaluated. 
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Internet Data Sources 
 
The Data Page by Damodaran, accessed in May 2010: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html 
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1: ADDITONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS 
General statistics on the data set 
 
As given in the data section we have adjusted our data set. The summary 
statistic below shows an overview on the data set.  
 
Table 12 – Summary statistics on general data set 
Variable Obs Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
t_q 47543 4.076376 0.769732 1.279417 2.424875 33.74464 0 
3926.92
9 
roa 46389 -0.09852 -0.02124 0.089148 0.15625 1.412149 -119.55 
6.32692
3 
ins 11080 0.10249 0.024 0.05 0.11 0.143171 0.0005 1 
ins_t2 7723 0.105086 0.025 0.052 0.116 0.143338 0.0005 1 
itn 42085 0.392212 0.0694 0.3531 0.6866 0.320584 0 0.9999 
vs 11080 440.1851 35.621 92.4546 252.6512 2984.872 0 
103671.
9 
vs_t2 7723 493.8599 42.699 106.335 280.8894 3193.045 0 
103671.
9 
size 47543 5.022745 3.317816 5.125154 6.840974 2.661779 -2.30259 13.5285 
leverage 42986 0.386047 0.008116 0.176165 0.376666 1.771399 0 111 
beta 43533 0.942034 0.65 0.9 1.2 0.435124 0 7.9 
 
 
However this statistics show astronomic values for t_q which is our main 
variable in this study. Therefore we see a need for further adjustments with 
regard to Tobin’s Q. 
 
Filtered for INS not equal to 0 
Table 13  - Summary statistics on robustness test data set 
Variable Obs Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
t_q 10955 1.767102 0.899807 1.351352 
2.15002
9 
1.37209
3 
0.00984
9 
9.96768
5 
roa 10950 0.131422 0.087035 0.132759 
0.18610
1 
0.11472
4 -1.4883 
1.38775
5 
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ins 10955 0.102016 0.024 0.049 0.109 
0.14274
4 0.0005 1 
ins_t2 7372 0.103544 0.024 0.0509 0.114 
0.14175
2 0.0005 1 
itn 10195 0.691417 0.5802 0.7446 0.8575 
0.22508
6 0 0.9999 
vs 10955 423.3251 35.2146 91.5381 248.011 
2926.14
1 0.0068 
103671.
9 
vs_t2 7372 483.3922 43.7455 107.257 
280.996
9 
3220.21
5 0 
103671.
9 
size 10955 7.46332 6.422597 7.350067 
8.38233
6 
1.45438
8 
3.15273
6 13.5285 
leverage 10099 0.223551 0.046273 0.204974 
0.33987
9 
0.20191
3 0 
3.67550
7 
Beta 10733 1.119356 0.9 1.05 1.3 
0.34963
5 0 3 
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Appendix 2: ADDITIONAL CORRELATION INFORMATION 
General Correlation Matrix 
Table 14 – Correlations on general data set 
  t_q roa ins ins_t2 itn vs vs_t2 size lev beta 
t_q 1          
roa -0.137 1         
ins 0.0534 
-
0.0253 1        
ins_t2 0.0569 
-
0.0074 0.8838 1       
itn 
-
0.0674 0.1556 
-
0.2326 
-
0.2026 1      
vs 0.1085 0.0425 0.1965 0.1747 
-
0.0712 1     
vs_t2 0.0652 0.0421 0.1704 0.2048 
-
0.0738 0.9293 1    
size 
-
0.1522 0.2816 
-
0.2311 
-
0.2398 0.586 0.1735 0.1909 1   
leverag
e 0.17 
-
0.2847 
-
0.0428 
-
0.0528 
-
0.0926 
-
0.0094 
-
0.0101 
-
0.1872 1  
beta 
-
0.0226 0.0344 
-
0.0507 
-
0.0301 0.3005 
-
0.0235 -0.022 0.2723 
-
0.0496 1 
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As used in 5.2.2 robustness check. Data filtered for ins not equal to 0: 
Table 15 – Correlations on robustness check data set 
  t_q roa ins ins_t2 itn vs vs_t2 size leverage beta 
t_q 1          
roa 0.2582 1         
ins 0.0472 
-
0.0231 1        
ins_t2 0.0523 
-
0.0105 0.8848 1       
itn 0.0593 0.1534 
-
0.2302 
-
0.2015 1      
vs 0.0885 0.0369 0.1858 0.1671 
-
0.0679 1     
vs_t2 0.0551 0.0397 0.1698 0.1961 
-
0.0803 0.9471 1    
size 
-
0.1976 0.1224 
-
0.2302 
-
0.2467 0.0717 0.1788 0.1878 1   
leverage 
-
0.1689 
-
0.0135 
-
0.0417 
-
0.0572 
-
0.0414 
-
0.0059 
-
0.0086 0.2464 1  
beta 0.0121 
-
0.2654 
-
0.0519 -0.027 0.0376 
-
0.0254 
-
0.0197 
-
0.0288 -0.0552 1 
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